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The Structural Exceptionalism  
of Bankruptcy Administration
Rafael I. Pardo
Kathryn A. Watts
ABSTrAcT
The current system of administration of the Bankruptcy Code is highly anomalous. 
It stands as one of the few major federal civil statutory regimes administered almost 
exclusively through adjudication in the courts—not through a federal regulatory agency. 
This means that rather than fitting bankruptcy into a regulatory model, the U.S. Congress 
has chosen to give the courts primary interpretive authority in the field of bankruptcy, 
delegating to courts the power to engage in residual policymaking.
Although scholars have noted some narrow aspects of the structural exceptionalism of 
bankruptcy administration, Congress’s decision to locate responsibility for bankruptcy 
policymaking almost exclusively with the federal judiciary, with little input from 
administrative agencies, has evaded scholarly attention.  This Article aims to fill the gap by 
analyzing the congressional decision to locate residual policymaking power in the courts. 
After identifying the structural anomalies of the current court-centered model and 
some of the constitutional and policy-driven concerns that flow therefrom, this Article 
makes the case for moving bankruptcy toward an administrative model with a regulatory 
agency charged with setting bankruptcy policy.  Such a shift away from bankruptcy 
exceptionalism could bring greater expertise, accountability, uniformity, accessibility, 
transparency, prospective clarity, and flexibility to policymaking in the bankruptcy arena. 
In addition, this shift could alleviate some of the constitutional issues that cast doubt 
on the legitimacy of our current system, such as Article III questions highlighted by the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Stern v. Marshall.
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INTRODUCTION 
Our current system of bankruptcy administration is highly anomalous.  The 
Bankruptcy Code1 is one of the few major federal civil statutory regimes adminis-
tered almost exclusively through adjudication in the courts—not through a federal 
regulatory agency.2  This means that rather than fitting bankruptcy into a regula-
tory model—as the U.S. Congress has done, for example, with the securities laws 
administered by the SEC or the tax laws administered by the IRS—Congress chose 
to delegate administration of the Bankruptcy Code to the courts, with little input 
from federal administrative agencies.3 
Noting some of the structural anomalies of bankruptcy administration, a few 
scholars have analyzed some narrow consequences of Congress’s decision to create 
a court-centered bankruptcy system, such as how the judicially administered system 
calls on courts to engage in non-judicial, administrative tasks.4  Scholars have gen-
erally failed, however, to identify perhaps the most significant consequence of 
Congress’s choice of delegate: Courts routinely engage in a lawmaking function by 
filling in the gaps in the Bankruptcy Code.5  Congress, in other words, chose to 
  
1. This Article uses the terms “Bankruptcy Code” and “Code” to refer to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended primarily at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 
(2006)). 
2. See Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial Lawmaking in a Statutory 
Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 84 (2006); Matthew Stephenson & Kristin Hickman, The 
Administrative Law of Borrowed Regulations: Legal Questions Regarding the Bankruptcy Law’s 
Incorporation of IRS Standards, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, Jan. 2008, at 1, 1. 
3. See Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards a Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy, 83 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 654 (2008) (“The current distribution of bankruptcy jurisdiction reflects 
a series of political decisions to make bankruptcy a matter of adjudication rather than agency administra-
tion.”); cf. Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Implied Good Faith Filing Requirement: 
Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 919, 963 (1991) (“It is the judiciary, far 
more than Congress, which controls the evolution of bankruptcy policy.”). 
4. See infra notes 416–421 and accompanying text. 
5. A few scholars have recognized the lawmaking function currently played by the courts in the bank-
ruptcy sphere.  See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 2, at 84 (“The exercise of lawmaking power by bankruptcy 
courts is consistent with the post–New Deal system of administrative agencies exercising law-making 
power through rule-making and adjudications.”); cf. Thomas M. Mackey, Post-Footstar Balancing: 
Toward Better Constructions of § 365(c)(1) and Beyond, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 405, 478 (2010) (“[T]he 
fact that Congress chose not to make an administrative agency such as the PTO, Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), or Food and Drug Administration (FDA), but did choose to create 
specialized bankruptcy courts as the only means for formal, legally binding restructuring or liqui-
dation bankruptcy procedures, implies that Congress saw bankruptcy courts as having quasi-
administrative, as well as adjudicative, functions.”).  These scholars, however, either have touched on 
the issue only in passing or have discussed the judicial role in bankruptcy without evincing an 
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delegate policymaking power in the bankruptcy arena to the courts rather than an 
administrative agency, empowering courts to resolve “competing interests which 
Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be re-
solved.”6 
Our central claim—that courts function as lawmakers in the bankruptcy are-
na because of their delegated policymaking powers—runs right up against the 
longheld “fiction that courts, particularly Article III courts, do not make law.”7  Al-
though it is well accepted that residual policymaking power stands as an inevita-
ble consequence of gaps in statutory frameworks,8 the literature focusing on 
Congress’s delegation of interpretive powers tends to view “Congress’s choice as 
binary: Congress can either resolve policy issues itself or leave the relevant decisions 
to an agency.”9  Courts are rarely viewed as potential recipients of delegated law-
making authority.  Instead, thanks to the fiction that the courts do not make the 
law, courts are often said to find the law by “discerning what the law is, rather than 
decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be.”10  Thus, “the very 
same statutory instructions, yielding the very same level of ambiguity” that is 
viewed “as a delegation in the administrative context, will be treated outside the 
  
awareness of the choice-of-delegate issues raised by Congress’s empowerment of the courts rather 
than an agency. 
6. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).  In using the term 
“policymaking” in this Article, we refer to situations in which Congress has not resolved a question 
of statutory meaning, leaving the resolution of competing interests to some other institution.  See 
generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225, 2228 (1997) 
(“[A]ny time Congress enacts a statute that does not resolve an interpretive question that arises in 
the process of administering the statute, Congress has created the need for some other institution to 
resolve a policy dispute.”); Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to Administrative Law’s Erie Doctrine, 101 
NW. U. L. REV. 997, 1024 (2007) (“[S]electing one reading of an ambiguous statute over another can 
be viewed as a ‘political act’ that turns on policy questions.”). 
7. Lisa Bressman, The Judicial Playing Field: Courts as Lawmakers, JOTWELL (July 11, 2011), 
http://adlaw.jotwell.com/the-judicial-playing-field-courts-as-lawmakers. 
8. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 287 (James Madison) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1885) (“All new laws, 
though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest and most mature delib-
eration, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and 
ascertained by a series of particular . . . adjudications.”); see also Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: 
Judicially Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 428 (2008). 
9. Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate: Judicial and Agency Interpretations 
of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 365 (2010) (emphasis added). 
10. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also 
Charles H. Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 25 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. 
JUDGES 49, 54 n.18 (2005) (arguing that the “making of agency law or administrative policymaking 
must be sharply distinguished from statutory interpretation” conducted by judges). 
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administrative context as ordinary legislation subject to ordinary judicial interpre-
tation” using traditional tools of statutory construction.11 
Margaret Lemos recently highlighted this fiction, demonstrating that “Congress 
can and does delegate policymaking discretion to the federal courts.”12  Congress, for 
example, has done so in a variety of contexts, such as the Sherman Act,13 Title VII,14 
and patent law.15  Nonetheless, the fiction persists, leading many scholars to fail to 
acknowledge that courts exercise a policymaking function—just as agencies do—
“when they fill in the gaps left by broad delegations of power.”16  Hence, it is per-
haps understandable that bankruptcy scholars have generally failed to take note of, 
or perhaps have turned a blind eye to, the central policymaking role played by the 
courts in administering the Bankruptcy Code. 
The inattention given to Congress’s choice of delegate in the bankruptcy 
sphere is unfortunate because, given the significant differences between courts and 
agencies, Congress’s choice of delegate implicates important questions of institu-
tional design.17  For example, bankruptcy judges’ decisions, which are usually 
reviewed by generalist Article III judges, lack precedential effect,18 and bankruptcy 
judges’ decisions do not receive formal deference from Article III courts when ques-
tions of law are at issue on appeal.19  This differentiates bankruptcy courts from 
  
11. Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of 
Deference With the Judiciary’s Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 77 (2000). 
12. Lemos, supra note 9, at 365.  A few other scholars also have recognized the choice-of-delegate 
question between courts and agencies.  Cf. Amnon Lehavi, Judicial Review of Judicial Lawmaking, 
96 MINN. L. REV. 520, 576 (2011) (“Entrusting courts with the task of giving content to . . . a norm 
goes beyond resolving specific disputes.  In fact, it requires courts to engage in lawmaking by 
delineating the broad contours of human conduct . . . .”).  Compare H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT 
OF LAW 131 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing the scenario in which “the legislature sets up very general 
standards and then delegates to an administrative, rule-making body acquainted with the varying 
types of case, the task of fashioning rules adapted to their special needs”), with id. at 132 (“Where the 
decisions of the court . . . are regarded as precedents, their specification of the variable standard is very 
like the exercise of delegated rule-making power by an administrative body, though there are also 
obvious differences.”). 
13. See Thomas C. Arthur, Workable Antitrust Law: The Statutory Approach to Antitrust, 62 TUL. L. REV. 
1163, 1166 (1988); Lemos, supra note 8, at 462. 
14. See Lemos, supra note 9 (analyzing the judiciary’s role in interpreting Title VII). 
15. See, e.g., Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1751 (2011); Arti K. 
Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1035, 1041 (2003). 
16. Lemos, supra note 8, at 408; see also id. (“[V]irtually no [scholarly] effort has been made to fit dele-
gations to courts into nondelegation theory or practice.”). 
17. Notably, Congress’s choice of delegate may not always be made intentionally.  See Lemos, supra note 9, 
at 366 n.10. 
18. See infra note 266 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra note 108 and accompanying text. 
Bankruptcy Administration 389 
 
administrative agencies, which can invoke doctrines like Chevron deference once 
they have issued binding interpretations of statutory ambiguities.20  Additionally, 
the judges interpreting the Bankruptcy Code are constrained by stare decisis prin-
ciples when resolving legal questions once an Article III court has issued a prece-
dential opinion, and hence the courts, unlike an administrative agency, do not enjoy 
the flexibility to easily adapt to changing circumstances.21  The judges who decide 
bankruptcy matters are also more politically insulated than administrative agen-
cies.22  Furthermore, courts do not set policy through a transparent process that in-
vites general public deliberation and participation.  Nor can courts control which 
issues will present themselves for decision.  Unlike policy set by regulatory agencies 
through notice-and-comment rulemaking, courts set policy through case-by-case 
adjudication and decide only the matters presented in a particular case.23  Taking 
into account these and other institutional differences between courts and agencies, 
this Article ultimately concludes that courts are ill equipped to set bankruptcy policy 
and that the locus of bankruptcy policymaking should be shifted to an administra-
tive agency with substantive rulemaking powers. 
This Article’s focus on institutional design in the bankruptcy context is particu-
larly timely for a variety of reasons.  Most prominently, the recent Great Recession 
and its accompanying increase in bankruptcy filings both by companies (including 
the spectacular business failures of Lehman Brothers, General Motors, and Chrysler) 
and by individuals (including a rising tide of student-loan borrowers) have high-
lighted the significance of bankruptcy policy in our country.24  In addition, during 
the 2011 Term, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down Stern v. Marshall,25 holding 
that bankruptcy courts could not constitutionally enter a final judgment on a state 
  
20. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (calling for def-
erence to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions); infra notes 284–287 
and accompanying text. 
21. See infra Part II.B.6. 
22. See infra Part II.B.2 (describing how bankruptcy judges are appointed by Article III judges through 
a process that insulates them from political control and how they serve fourteen-year terms). 
23. See infra Part II.B.4; see also Mackey, supra note 5, at 479 (“The EPA can create environmental 
health and safety standards independent of any particular environmental source of harm or risk to health 
or safety, but the bankruptcy court is primarily driven by the individual debtor seeking liquidation or 
restructuring.”). 
24. See NAT’L ASS’N CONSUMER BANKR. ATTORNEYS, STUDENT LOAN DEBT CRISIS SURVEY 
(2012), available at http://nacba.org/Portals/0/Documents/Student Loan Debt/020712 NACBA 
student loan survey.pdf (reporting that approximately 81 percent of “bankruptcy attorneys [surveyed] 
say that potential clients with student loan debt have increased ‘significantly’ or ‘somewhat’ in the 
last three–four years” and that approximately 39 percent of such attorneys “have seen potential student 
loan client cases jump 25–50 percent in the last three–four years”). 
25. 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). 
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law tortious interference counterclaim.26  In calling into doubt the constitutionality 
of bankruptcy courts’ adjudication of common law counterclaims, Chief Justice 
Roberts was careful to distinguish the bankruptcy context from traditional regula-
tory adjudication.27  Specifically, his opinion seemed to suggest that although the 
Court has allowed traditional agencies involved in administering complex regula-
tory regimes to adjudicate even common law claims, bankruptcy does not involve an 
administrative agency and, hence, is different.28  His opinion, accordingly, highlights 
the need to query whether bankruptcy should be different. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts.  Part I develops our claim that Congress 
has located primary responsibility for bankruptcy policymaking within the federal 
judiciary.  We describe how Congress has delegated policymaking to the federal ju-
diciary despite the existence of two little known federal agencies in the bankruptcy 
arena: the United States Trustee (UST) Program, which is a component of the 
U.S. Department of Justice, and the Bankruptcy Administrators (BA) Program, 
which operates under the Judicial Conference of the United States.   
Part II then analyzes a variety of constitutional and policy-driven concerns 
that flow from our current court-centered model.  Specifically, Part II argues that the 
method used to remove BAs from office may well be unconstitutional and describes 
how the court-centered model of bankruptcy administration raises thorny Article 
III questions relating to the constitutionality of the bankruptcy courts themselves.  
Part II also considers the relevance of the nondelegation doctrine to Congress’s 
choice of delegate.  Although the current weakened version of the nondelegation 
doctrine does not render Congress’s delegation to the courts unconstitutional per 
se, Part II argues that the relevance of the nondelegation doctrine cannot be dis-
missed out of hand.  In the administrative law world, courts have condoned rela-
tively standardless delegations of policymaking authority to agencies predominantly 
because of functional considerations that make agencies well suited to receive del-
egations of policymaking power, including agencies’ relative expertise, accounta-
bility, flexibility, accessibility, and ability to achieve uniformity.  As Part II 
describes, however, these same functional considerations do not similarly tip in 
favor of Congress’s decision to delegate policymaking power to courts in the bank-
ruptcy context. 
Finally, Part III makes the case for moving bankruptcy toward an adminis-
trative model through the creation of a federal bankruptcy agency endowed, at a 
  
26. Id. at 2620. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
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minimum, with substantive rulemaking powers.  Part III begins with a story of path 
dependency, identifying the historical roots of the court-centered model and ana-
lyzing whether various reform efforts illuminate how bankruptcy could be rede-
signed moving forward.  With this history in mind, Part III turns to consider how a 
federal bankruptcy agency might be created and charged with setting federal bank-
ruptcy policy.  In the end, although any such bankruptcy agency would need to be 
carefully designed so as to minimize the risk of capture by creditors, lawyers and 
dominant industry groups, we believe that such a shift away from bankruptcy excep-
tionalism toward an administrative model could help address some of the consti-
tutional issues currently facing bankruptcy and could bring greater expertise, 
accountability, uniformity, accessibility, transparency, prospective clarity, and flex-
ibility to bankruptcy administration. 
I. JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
The Bankruptcy Code, which is primarily embodied in Title 11 of the United 
States Code, represents a complex federal statutory scheme consisting of nine chap-
ters.  The most recent comprehensive overhaul of the Code highlights its complexi-
ty: The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
(BAPCPA)29 constituted 195 pages in one volume of the official federal session 
laws.30  The product of inartful drafting,31 BAPCPA’s suboptimal statutory design 
has produced myriad unintended consequences, including statutory gaps.32 
Even though Congress has created federal administrative agencies for nearly 
all major, complex, federal civil statutory schemes—such as the securities laws, con-
sumer protection laws, labor laws, environmental laws, food and drug laws, immi-
gration laws, and tax laws—Congress did not create a federal administrative agency 
charged with filling in the statutory gaps that Congress either inadvertently or inten-
tionally left unresolved in the Bankruptcy Code.33  Rather, Congress chose to vest 
primary interpretation of the Code in the courts. 
  
29. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23. 
30. See id. at 23–217. 
31. See David Gray Carlson, Means Testing: The Failed Bankruptcy Revolution of 2005, 15 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 223, 227 (2007); Keith M. Lundin, Ten Principles of BAPCPA: Not What Was 
Advertised, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2005, at 1, 70. 
32. See Thomas F. Waldron & Neil M. Berman, Principled Principles of Statutory Interpretation: A Judicial 
Perspective After Two Years of BAPCPA, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 195, 228 (2007). 
33. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Current Structure of the Bankruptcy System 
Before developing our central claim that the open-textured provisions in the 
Code require courts to fill statutory gaps and thereby to engage in policymaking, it is 
necessary to briefly sketch the current structure of bankruptcy administration and 
the key players operating within the system. 
1. The Nature of a Bankruptcy Case 
A debtor voluntarily commences a bankruptcy case by filing a petition under 
the operative chapter of the Code (that is, Chapter 7, 9, 11, 12, or 13) pursuant 
to which the debtor wishes the case to proceed.34  For example, if a debtor seeks re-
lief in the form of a Chapter 7 discharge, she must be eligible for such relief and 
must file a petition under that chapter.35  In exchange for this relief, the debtor must 
give up all of her nonexempt assets, which will be liquidated by a trustee.36  The 
proceeds from liquidation are used to pay the claims of the debtor’s creditors,37 
and, in exchange, the Chapter 7 discharge releases the debtor from personal liabil-
ity for most of her prebankruptcy debts.38  In this fashion, the debtor obtains a 
fresh start.39  Relief under the Code’s other operative chapters proceeds according 
to the same basic principle—the discharge of debt in exchange for the debtor’s assets 
and/or future income.40 
A bankruptcy court, through referral from the district court,41 has original and 
exclusive jurisdiction over a bankruptcy case,42 and original but nonexclusive jurisdic-
tion over all civil proceedings “arising under” the Code, or “arising in” or “related to” 
cases under the Code.43  A proceeding “arises under” the Code if the cause of action 
  
34. 11 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006). 
35. See id. §§ 109(b), 301(a). 
36. See id. § 541(a)(1) (defining property of the bankruptcy estate); § 522(b)(1) (allowing the debtor to claim 
as exempt certain property from the bankruptcy estate); § 704(a)(1) (requiring the trustee to “collect 
and reduce to money the property of the estate”). 
37. See id. § 726(a) (providing for the distribution of property of the estate to holders of claims against the 
debtor). 
38. See id. §§ 727(b), 523(a), 524(a)(2). 
39. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). 
40. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a)(1), 1328(a). 
41. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2006).  The federal district courts have entered standing orders that, in the 
first instance, refer bankruptcy cases to the bankruptcy courts.  Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. 
Pardo, An Empirical Investigation Into Appellate Structure and the Perceived Quality of Appellate Review, 
61 VAND. L. REV. 1745, 1756 (2008). 
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a). 
43. Id. § 1334(b). 
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is created by the Code itself.44  Proceedings “arising in” a case under the Code are 
“primarily those administrative proceedings that, while not based on any right cre-
ated by [the Code], nevertheless have no existence outside bankruptcy.”45  Finally, 
a proceeding is “related to” a case under the Code if “the outcome of the proceed-
ing could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bank-
ruptcy.”46  Given the distinction between a bankruptcy case and civil proceedings 
within the case, the case itself constitutes an administrative matter47 within which 
disputes may, but need not, arise.48 
Disputes in bankruptcy can involve a variety of litigants, including not only 
debtors and creditors but also either the UST or the BA, which are the representa-
tives from one of the two federal agencies that operate in the bankruptcy system.49  In 
addition, bankruptcy disputes generally involve private trustees.  Although private 
trustees are selected and appointed by government actors (the UST or the BA),50 
they are not governmental employees.  Instead, they are private individuals compen-
sated to administer the bankruptcy estate.  In Chapter 7 cases, for example, the pri-
vate trustee’s “principal duty is to collect and reduce to money the property of the 
estate for which he serves, and to close up the estate.”51  If assets are to be distributed, 
the private trustee may also be required to examine proofs of claim filed by creditors 
and “object to the allowance of any claim that is improper.”52 
In addition to involving a variety of litigants, bankruptcy disputes can involve 
a wide range of matters.  The nature and extent of litigants and disputes within a 
bankruptcy case often turn on whether the case has been filed by an individual 
debtor (a consumer case) or by a legal entity (a business case).  For example, in a 
  
44. Menk v. Lapaglia (In re Menk), 241 B.R. 896, 909 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999). 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 908. 
47. See id. at 910 (“[A bankruptcy case] has two main functions.  It provides for the existence, and the 
nonjudicial administration, of the estate under which the prime function is the performance of the du-
ties of the trustee under the supervision of the U.S. trustee.  Second, it serves as the administrative 
mechanism by which the debtor receives a discharge and a fresh start.” (emphasis added)). 
48. See, e.g., id. at 907–08 (referring to “the differences between the bankruptcy itself (i.e. the [28 U.S.C.] 
§ 1334(a) case) and civil proceedings within the bankruptcy”); In re Attorneys at Law & Debt Relief 
Agencies, 353 B.R. 318, 322–23 (S.D. Ga. 2006) (“A ‘case’ refers to a matter initiated by the filing of a 
petition seeking relief under the Bankruptcy Code.  A ‘proceeding’ refers to everything which happens 
within the context of a bankruptcy case.”); see also infra note 186 and accompanying text (providing 
statistics for the number of bankruptcy cases and adversary proceedings filed during the 2009 and 2010 
fiscal years). 
49. See infra notes 86–92 and accompanying text. 
50. See infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
51. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 379 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6335. 
52. Id. 
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consumer case, creditors may object to property that a debtor claims as exempt;53 
they may argue that some of the debtor’s debts are nondischargeable;54 and they 
may argue that the debtor should be denied a discharge.55  In a business case, credi-
tors may object to the confirmation of a Chapter 11 debtor’s reorganization plan;56 
they may object to the use of estate property by the reorganizing debtor;57 they may 
seek relief from the automatic stay if their interest in the reorganizing debtor’s prop-
erty is not adequately protected;58 and they may object to the financing that the re-
organizing debtor seeks to finance its postbankruptcy operations.59  Finally, whether 
in a consumer case or a business case, creditors may litigate against one another—
for example, by challenging the validity or the secured status of each other’s claims.60 
2. Agency and Judicial Roles 
In terms of governmental players operating within the bankruptcy system, both 
the courts and two federal agencies—the UST Program and the BA Program—
play a role.  These agencies—the latter located in the judiciary and the former lo-
cated in the executive branch—split their authority along geographic lines and 
have narrowly defined duties.  Moreover, they do not possess the power to set poli-
cy relating to the restructuring of debtor–creditor relationships under the Code.  
Rather, the courts fill that role. 
a. The UST and BA Programs 
The UST and BA Programs constitute two relatively obscure federal agencies 
involved in the bankruptcy arena.61  First, the UST Program is a component of the 
Department of Justice.  It consists of twenty-one regional UST Offices.62  Each  
 
  
53. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) (2006). 
54. See id. § 523(a). 
55. See id. § 727(a). 
56. See id. § 1129. 
57. See id. § 363(b)(1), (e). 
58. See id. § 362(d)(1). 
59. See id. § 364(b)–(d). 
60. See id. §§ 502, 506. 
61. By using the phrase “relatively obscure,” we do not mean to suggest that the work of these agencies is 
unimportant.  Rather, it is our sense that, if asked, most policymakers and legal academics would not 
know what the UST and BA Programs do. 
62. See 28 U.S.C. § 581(a) (2006).  While the twenty-one regions established by the Judicial Code 
encompass all federal judicial districts, see id., including the judicial districts established for the states 
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regional office is run by one UST63 and may also be staffed by assistant USTs.64 
While the Judicial Code provides that the Attorney General of the Department 
of Justice (AG) shall supervise the UST Program,65 the AG has delegated this task 
to the Executive Office for United States Trustees (EOUST), which the AG cre-
ated and which is headed by a director appointed by the AG.66  The supervisory and 
coordinating functions of the EOUST include providing leadership and policy di-
rection to the USTs, evaluating the effectiveness of UST Program operations, co-
ordinating the development of the Program’s strategic plan, and collecting and 
disseminating data on UST operations.67 
In creating the UST Program, Congress excluded all federal judicial districts 
located in Alabama and North Carolina.68  Instead, Congress authorized the Judicial 
Conference of the United States (JCUS)69 to promulgate regulations for the ap-
pointment of individuals in any of those judicial districts who would have similar 
duties to a UST.70  This geographical carveout, which resulted in the BA Program 
operating in Alabama and North Carolina and the UST Program operating ev-
  
of Alabama and North Carolina, see id. § 581(a)(4), (a)(21), the UST Program does not operate in 
those two states, see infra notes 68–75, 81–83 and accompanying text. 
63. See 28 U.S.C. § 581(a). 
64. See id. § 582(a). 
65. See id. § 586(c). 
66. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.37 (2012) (“The Executive Office for United States Trustees shall be headed by a 
Director appointed by the Attorney General.”); GEN. GOV’T DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, GAO/GGD-92-133, BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION: JUSTIFICATION LACKING 
FOR CONTINUING TWO PARALLEL PROGRAMS 4 (1992), available at http://archive.gao.gov/ 
d35t11/147775.pdf (“The Attorney General established the Executive Office for United States 
Trustees (EOUST) to provide legal, administrative, and management support to the individual 
UST districts.”).  Although no statute contains an express provision establishing the EOUST, the 
Judicial Code does make two references to the EOUST.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 156(f), 586(a)(3)(A)(i).  
Presumably, the AG created the EOUST pursuant to the AG’s statutory right to delegate his or her 
authority, which includes authority over the UST Program.  See id. § 510 (“The Attorney General 
may from time to time make such provisions as he considers appropriate authorizing the performance 
by any other officer, employee, or agency of the Department of Justice of any function of the Attorney 
General.”); id. § 586(c) (“Each United States trustee shall be under the general supervision of the 
Attorney General, who shall provide general coordination and assistance to the United States 
trustees.”); 28 C.F.R. § 0.38 (“The [EOUST] Director shall perform such duties relating to such 
functions and others under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 as may be assigned by the Attorney 
General or the Deputy Attorney General.”). 
67. See Executive Office for United States Trustees, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/jmd/mps/ 
manual/eoust.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2012) (depicting an EOUST organizational chart). 
68. See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. 
L. No. 99-554, § 302(d)(3)(A), (E), 100 Stat. 3088, 3121–22 (amended 1990 and 2000). 
69. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (establishing the JCUS). 
70. See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act § 302(d)(3)(I), 
100 Stat. at 3123. 
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erywhere else, appears to have been the product of political compromise.  The 
Bankruptcy Code enacted in 1978 established the UST Program as a six-year pilot 
program in which eighteen judicial districts participated, including the Northern 
District of Alabama.71  The federal judiciary in that district did not have a positive 
experience with the pilot program,72 and the judges apparently lobbied Senator 
Howell Heflin (D-AL) for Alabama to be excluded from the UST program when 
Congress expanded it nationally.73  The bankruptcy judges from North Carolina 
appear to have similarly lobbied Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) for exclusion from the 
UST program.74  A political compromise resulted that allowed these districts to 
abstain from the UST program.75 
The JCUS created the BA Program by approving regulations, commonly 
referred to as the “Regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States 
Governing the Bankruptcy Administrator Program,”76 in September 1987.77  
Those regulations establish a BA Program for the judicial districts in Alabama and 
North Carolina,78 with a BA appointed to each district in those states.79  The JCUS 
regulations describe BAs as “independent, non-judicial officers of the Judiciary 
when performing their official duties.”80 
Although Congress initially mandated that the federal judicial districts oper-
ating with BAs would ultimately be incorporated into the UST Program,81 Congress 
  
71. See Dan J. Schulman, The Constitution, Interest Groups, and the Requirements of Uniformity: The United 
States Trustee and the Bankruptcy Administrator Programs, 74 NEB. L. REV. 91, 121 & n.161 (1995). 
72. See 132 CONG. REC. 10,008–10 (1986) (statement of Sen. Heflin). 
73. See Schulman, supra note 71, at 123.  Senator Heflin may have been particularly sympathetic to such 
complaints given that he had served as chief justice of the Supreme Court of Alabama prior to 
joining the Senate.  See 132 CONG. REC. 10,013 (statement of Sen. Thurmond).  Senator Heflin 
revealed his view regarding the primacy of the courts in making the following comments: “The de-
cision to ‘opt-out’ [of the UST program] will be made based on a majority vote of the bankruptcy 
judges and the chief district judge within a judicial district.  This leaves the decision where it should 
be—within the judicial districts which will be most affected by the decision.”  Id. at 10,009 (statement of 
Sen. Heflin) (emphasis added). 
74. See Schulman, supra note 71, at 123. 
75. See 132 CONG. REC. 10,009 (statement of Sen. Heflin). 
76. 9 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY § 210(a) (2010) 
[hereinafter JCUS REG.]. 
77. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 49, 53–54, 81–82 (1987), available at http://www.us 
courts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/Proceedings/Proceedings.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Feder
alCourts/judconf/proceedings/1987-09.pdf. 
78. 9 JCUS REG., supra note 76, § 220.40(a). 
79. Id. § 220.40(b). 
80. Id. § 220.40(d). 
81. See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
No. 99-554, § 302(d)(3)(A)(ii), 100 Stat. 3088, 3121 (requiring judicial districts in Alabama and 
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abandoned that mandate in 2000,82 leaving the choice to each judicial district in 
Alabama and North Carolina to determine when, if ever, it will join the UST 
Program.83  Hence, the BA Program currently operates in North Carolina and 
Alabama, and the UST Program operates everywhere else. 
Despite covering different geographic territory, the duties of the UST and BA 
Programs largely mirror each other.84  While many of these duties involve reporting 
or monitoring functions,85 both USTs and BAs also have the power to raise any issue 
and to appear and be heard in any case or proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code.86  
  
North Carolina to join the UST Program by October 1, 1992); Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 
Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 317(a), 104 Stat. 5089, 5115 (extending date for judicial districts in Alabama 
and North Carolina to join the UST Program to October 1, 2002). 
82. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-518, § 501, 114 Stat. 2410, 2421 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 581 note (2006)) (eliminating requirement that judicial districts in Alabama 
and North Carolina join the UST Program by a date certain). 
83. See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act § 302(d)(3)(A)(ii), 
100 Stat. at 3121 (providing that any judicial district in Alabama or North Carolina will not join 
the UST Program unless “such district elects to be included in a bankruptcy region established in 
[28 U.S.C. § 581(a)]”); id. § 302(d)(3)(B), 100 Stat. at 3122 (providing that election of a judicial 
district in Alabama or North Carolina to join the UST Program “shall be made upon a majority 
vote of the chief judge of such district and each bankruptcy judge in such judicial district in favor of 
such election”). 
84. See GEN. GOV’T DIV., supra note 66, at 1 (“For the most part, the [UST and BA] programs use 
similar procedures for supervising trustees and monitoring individual bankruptcy cases.”).  There is, 
however, one major difference between the organizational structures of the UST and BA Programs.  
Specifically, there does not appear to be an analogue to the EOUST within the BA Program.  See 
28 U.S.C. § 601 (providing that the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AOUSC) 
“shall be supervised by a Director . . . appointed and subject to removal by the Chief Justice of the 
United States, after consulting with the Judicial Conference”).  Nonetheless, the JCUS regulations 
provide that the Director of the AOUSC, “under the [JCUS’s] supervision through its Committee on 
the Administration of the Bankruptcy System, must oversee implementing the regulations governing 
bankruptcy administrators’ qualifications and selection.”  9 JCUS REG., supra note 76, § 230.30(b). 
85. For example, UST duties include (1) monitoring repayment plans filed under Chapters 11, 12, and 
13 of the Bankruptcy Code, and (2) notifying the appropriate U.S. Attorney of matters which may 
constitute a crime and, on the request of the U.S. Attorney, assisting the U.S. Attorney in carrying out 
prosecutions.  28 U.S.C. § 586(a); see also 11 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2006) (providing that, under certain 
circumstances, a UST may serve on an interim basis as the private trustee in a bankruptcy case).  
Similarly, BA duties include (1) monitoring repayment plans filed under Chapters 11, 12, and 13 of 
the Bankruptcy Code, and (2) monitoring for abuses and reporting suspected abuses, including crim-
inal activity.  See 9 JCUS REG., supra note 76, § 240.10(e)(7), (e)(10), (f). 
86. See 11 U.S.C. § 307 (UST standing); Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 
§ 317(b), 104 Stat. 5089, 5115 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 307 note) (BA standing); see also 9 JCUS 
REG., supra note 76, § 240.20(b) (“Bankruptcy administrators may file objections, applications, 
responses, motions, appeals, and other pleadings concerning any matter affecting estate administra-
tion in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and 
local rules.”); id. § 240.20(b)(1) (“Bankruptcy administrators may appear and be heard concerning 
any matters affecting estate administration.”). 
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In some instances, the BA or the UST is the only party that may raise certain issues.87  
When exercising this power to act as a participant in the bankruptcy process, the 
UST and the BA do “not represent the federal government’s creditor interests: If 
the federal government is a creditor, other federal lawyers provide representa-
tion.”88  Instead, they simply participate as a litigant in “proceedings that essentially 
involve the resolution of private debtor–creditor relations,”89 operating as watchdogs 
and seeking to ensure that the bankruptcy laws are enforced.90  For example, USTs and 
BAs may move to have Chapter 7 debtors’ cases converted or dismissed,91 or their 
bankruptcy discharges denied or revoked, if the debtors do not comply with the law.92 
Not only do USTs and BAs have the power to participate in bankruptcy cases 
as litigants seeking to enforce the bankruptcy laws, but both also enjoy significant 
power over some of the actors who operate within the bankruptcy system, such as 
private trustees, lawyers,93 and financial counseling entities.  For example, USTs 
and BAs have the power to select and supervise private trustees in bankruptcy cas-
es,94 and the UST and BA programs set the substantive qualifications for these 
private trustees’ appointments.95  In addition, most individual debtors must obtain 
  
87. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 707(a)(3), (b)(6). 
88. See Thomas D. Buckley, The Untapped Power of Bankruptcy’s Wild Card: The United States Trustee, 6 J. 
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 249, 250 (1997). 
89. Id. 
90. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 4 (1977) (describing USTs as “bankruptcy watchdogs”), reprinted in 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5966; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL MANUAL FOR UNITED STATES 
TRUSTEES 38–39 (1988), available at http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/ust_org/ustp_manual/docs/ 
vol1-1988AUG-general.pdf. 
91. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(a)(3), (b)(1). 
92. See id. § 727(c)–(d). 
93. See 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(A)(i) (2006) (granting USTs the power to review—in accordance with 
“procedural guidelines adopted by the Executive Office of the United States Trustee”—and to object 
to applications for compensation of reimbursement of fees that have been filed by professionals, 
such as attorneys).  Pursuant to these powers, guidelines involving fees were published in the Federal 
Register in 1996.  See Guidelines for Reviewing Applications for Compensation and Reimbursement 
of Expenses Filed Under 11 U.S.C. 330, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,889 (May 17, 1996) (codified at 28 C.F.R. 
pt. 58 app. A).  The EOUST is currently revising its guidelines covering compensation sought by 
attorneys in certain large Chapter 11 cases.  See New Proposed Fee Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Nov. 
8, 2012, 10:01 AM), http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/rules_regulations/guidelines/proposed.htm. 
94. See 28 U.S.C. § 586(a), (c) (giving USTs the power to appoint and supervise private trustees); 9 JCUS 
REG., supra note 76, § 240.10(a) (empowering BAs to establish, maintain, and supervise Chapter 7 
panel trustees); id. § 240.10(g) (providing that BAs must recommend candidates to serve as trustees 
under Chapter 12 and 13 cases and must supervise Chapter 12 and 13 trustees). 
95. Notably, Congress specifically gave the Attorney General the power to set substantive qualifications 
for private trustees.  See 28 U.S.C. § 586(d); see also 28 C.F.R. §§ 58.3, 58.4 (2012) (setting forth 
the minimum qualifications for private trustees operating within the UST Program).  Furthermore, 
with respect to standing trustees appointed to handle Chapter 12 and 13 cases, Congress expressly 
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statutorily required prebankruptcy credit counseling and postbankruptcy finan-
cial management instruction,96 and Congress has given both USTs and BAs the 
power to approve such counseling entities.97 
Hence, both the UST and BA Programs enjoy significant authority to control 
private trustees, credit counseling and educational agencies, and other professionals 
operating within the bankruptcy arena.  Even when all these powers are taken into 
account, however, the powers that reside within the UST and BA Programs are 
carefully defined and limited.98  Most notably, neither agency enjoys broad rulemak-
ing powers that would enable it to set substantive bankruptcy policy at the heart of 
the Code: the restructuring of debtor–creditor relationships.99  Instead, the courts 
hold the power to do so.  Even though Congress has created some space for agency 
involvement and enforcement of the statutory regime, the courts maintain the ul-
timate authority to set substantive bankruptcy policy.100 
b. The Courts: Specialized Bankruptcy Courts and Article III Courts 
While bankruptcy jurisdiction is technically vested in the U.S. district courts, 
that jurisdiction is exercised by bankruptcy judges who are considered “unit[s] of the 
district court” and are known, in turn, as the bankruptcy courts.101  The Judicial 
  
gave the Attorney General (in consultation with the relevant UST) the power to fix their compen-
sation.  See 28 U.S.C. § 586(e). 
96. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(h), 727(a)(11), 1328(g). 
97. See id. § 111(b)–(d). 
98. See In re Gideon, Inc., 158 B.R. 528, 530–31 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993) (discussing limited role of 
UST); In re Johnson, 106 B.R. 623, 624 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989) (denying the UST’s request to require 
debtor in possession to imprint checks with “debtor-in-possession,” and holding that the UST 
Guidelines did not carry the force or effect of law); In re Crosby, 93 B.R. 798, 802 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 
1988) (“The ‘requirements’ of the United States Trustee are merely administrative in nature.”); cf. In re 
Vance, 120 B.R. 181, 185 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990) (“[T]he UST has literally nothing to work on 
until a bankruptcy case is filed in a Bankruptcy Court; all UST action is incident to bankruptcy pro-
ceedings in Bankruptcy Court.  Even when acting as an agency instead of as a litigant, the UST is an 
auxiliary to the Bankruptcy Court.”). 
99. See Leif M. Clark, Article III Issues in Bankruptcy—Preparing for the 21st Century, 1997 ANN. SURV. 
BANKR. L. 143, 155 n.7 (“The executive branch is charged with the responsibility for selecting and 
monitoring private trustees, but the United States Trustee has no direct responsibility for the re-
structuring of the debtor/creditor relationship in bankruptcy.”). 
100. See Lemos, supra note 9, at 365 n.6 (“This Article treats statutes that contain substantial gaps or ambi-
guities, and give courts primary interpretive authority to resolve those uncertainties, as delegations 
to courts. . . . It may also involve the efforts of one or more agencies, for example if agencies have 
been given authority to initiate and conduct litigation to force compliance with statutory requirements 
or to sanction violators.  Such statutes still are properly understood as judicially enforced, as any relief 
must come from the courts.” (citation omitted)). 
101. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (2006); see also supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text (discussing bankruptcy 
court jurisdiction).  Some circuits have held that a bankruptcy court does not fall within the Judicial 
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Code authorizes bankruptcy judgeships for every federal judicial district in the fifty 
states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.102  During the 2010 fiscal year, 
there were 338 active and 29 recalled bankruptcy judges.103 
Bankruptcy judges have the authority to “hear and determine” all core pro-
ceedings that arise under the Bankruptcy Code or that arise in a case under the 
Bankruptcy Code.104  These core proceedings lie at the heart of the bankruptcy case 
and include matters concerning (1) estate administration, (2) the allowance of credi-
tor claims, (3) relief from the automatic stay, (4) the recovery of preferential trans-
fers and fraudulent conveyances, (5) the dischargeability of debts, (6) discharge 
objections, and (7) confirmation of repayment plans.105  Thus, when a core pro-
ceeding is at issue, the bankruptcy judge is at the front line of administering the 
Bankruptcy Code, acting as the trial court in the system and making the initial call 
as to how to resolve any ambiguities in the Code.106 
Upon a decision by a bankruptcy court, appellate review may follow.  Al-
though in some jurisdictions appellate review may be first sought from a specialized 
bankruptcy appellate panel consisting of bankruptcy judges, appellate review is 
  
Code’s definition of “court of the United States.”  See Jones v. Bank of Santa Fe (In re Courtesy Inns, 
Ltd.), 40 F.3d 1084, 1086 (10th Cir. 1994); Perroton v. Gray (In re Perroton), 958 F.2d 889, 896 
(9th Cir. 1992).  But cf. In re Schaefer Salt Recovery, Inc., 542 F.3d 90, 105 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We find 
that although a bankruptcy court is not a ‘court of the United States’ within the meaning of § 451, it 
is a unit of the district court, which is a ‘court of the United States,’ and thus the bankruptcy court 
comes within the scope of § 451.”). 
102. See 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(2). 
103. JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS: 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 40 (2011), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2010/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf.   
104. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1).  The constitutional authority of bankruptcy courts to definitively resolve all 
such proceedings, however, has recently been called into question.  See infra Part II.A.1.  In addition, 
if a district court withdraws the reference to the bankruptcy court, then the district court will hear and 
determine the proceeding in the first instance.  See 28 U.S.C. § 157(d). 
105. Id. § 157(b)(2)(A)–(B), (F)–(J), (L). 
106. On the other hand, if a non-core proceeding is at issue, then the bankruptcy judge may or may not be 
the initial policymaker.  If the parties consent to the entry of a final order by the bankruptcy judge 
in a non-core proceeding, see id. § 157(c)(2), then the bankruptcy judge will be the initial policymaker.  
But without the consent of all parties, a bankruptcy judge may hear the matter but cannot enter a final 
order.  Instead, the judge must submit findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court, 
which must engage in de novo review of the findings and conclusions to which a party has specif-
ically objected.  See id. § 157(c)(1).  In this instance, it is the district court that acts as the initial 
policymaker—albeit not on a clean slate, but rather on a slate with recommendations issued by a 
judicial officer with specialized expertise.  This dynamic could result in deferential policymaking.  Cf. 
Lawrence P. King, Jurisdiction and Procedure Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, 38 VAND. L. 
REV. 675, 681–82 (1985) (“In practical terms, however, the nonarticle III court’s proposed findings 
and conclusions will be the findings and conclusions.  ‘Consider’ and ‘review’ will disintegrate into 
rubber-stamped acceptances of the bankruptcy court’s findings and conclusions.”). 
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most often conducted by Article III courts.107  On appeal, these courts have the 
power to review bankruptcy judges’ conclusions of law de novo.108  Hence, when an 
appeal is brought, the ultimate authority to fill in the gaps in the Code—and thereby 
to engage in the task of policymaking in the bankruptcy arena—falls to generalist 
Article III judges. 
B. Judicial Policymaking in the Bankruptcy Arena 
With an understanding of the nature of a bankruptcy case and the key players 
operating within the current system of bankruptcy administration, we turn now to 
support our central claim: Congress has left numerous interpretive questions involv-
ing the Bankruptcy Code unanswered, thereby delegating significant policymaking 
powers to the courts and empowering them, rather than an administrative agency, 
to authoritatively construe the meaning of ambiguities at the heart of the Bankruptcy 
Code.109 
Broadly speaking, the Code involves “the restructuring of debtor–creditor re-
lations.”110  More specifically, bankruptcy law generally focuses on two core con-
cepts: (1) providing debt relief for a financially distressed debtor, and (2) distrib-
uting a debtor’s assets and/or income for the benefit of creditors.111  Many of the 
Code’s provisions are highly detailed and limit the range of interstitial lawmaking 
because Congress’s intent is clear.  Others are quite open textured and ambiguous, 
however, thus providing a great deal of discretion to courts in fleshing out the de-
tails for the manner in which the Bankruptcy Code ought to be implemented.112  
  
107. See infra notes 268–283 and accompanying text. 
108. E.g., Peklar v. Ikerd (In re Peklar), 260 F.3d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir. 2001); Rifino v. United States (In 
re Rifino), 245 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2001). 
109. Cf. Daniel J. Bussel, Essay, Power, Authority, and Precedent in Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, 41 
UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1085 (1994) (“Bankruptcy courts are Article I tribunals, arguably consti-
tutionally analogous to administrative agencies, although they function within the judicial rather than 
the executive branch.”). 
110. N. Pipeline Constr. Co v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 (1982) (plurality opinion). 
111. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 7 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5793; H.R. REP. 
NO. 95-595, at 177–78 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138; REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, 
pt. 1, at 75, 76–81 (1973); William O. Douglas, Wage Earner Bankruptcies—State vs. Federal Control, 
42 YALE L.J. 591, 592–93 (1933); Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the 
Bankruptcy Courts: An Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 
405, 413–14 (2005). 
112. See, e.g., Bussel, supra note 109, at 1084–85 (noting that “the Supreme Court and Courts of 
Appeals have recently and frequently seen fit to remind the actors in the bankruptcy system that the 
courts’ lawmaking function is interstitial ” and that “courts will inevitably create a judicial gloss upon 
the Bankruptcy Code”); John T. Cross, Congressional Power to Extend Federal Jurisdiction to Disputes 
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In particular, as we describe below, Congress has left significant statutory gaps that 
implicate various core bankruptcy policies, including fresh-start and distributive 
policies, thereby enabling the courts to set policy while engaging in case-by-case 
dispute resolution. 
1. Policymaking Concerning the Fresh-Start Policy 
Bankruptcy law’s goal to provide debt relief for a financially distressed debtor is 
generally referred to as the fresh-start policy.113  The Code effectuates a debtor’s fresh 
start through the discharge of the debtor’s in personam liability for prebankruptcy 
debt.114 
a. The Discharge Itself 
The Bankruptcy Code generally mandates that, if a debtor is eligible for bank-
ruptcy relief,115 the court must grant the debtor a discharge.116  Hence, in the spec-
  
Outside Article III: A Critical Analysis From the Perspective of Bankruptcy, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1188, 
1226 n.140 (1993) (“As with all federal statutes, the federal courts may create ‘interstitial’ federal 
common law when interpreting and applying the Bankruptcy Code.”); Richard M. Hynes, Optimal 
Bankruptcy in a Non-optimal World, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1, 6 (2002) (“In many instances, the Code gives 
little guidance to courts that must adjust the utopian goal to the realities of the actual world.”); cf. 
Lawrence Ponoroff, The Dubious Role of Precedent in the Quest for First Principles in the Reform of the 
Bankruptcy Code: Some Lessons From the Civil Law and Realist Traditions, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173, 
210 (2000) (“My point is that the art of judging ought to be focused on putting into action the 
principles enunciated by the legislature [regarding bankruptcy]; to develop and extend them by pru-
dent and reasoned application consistent with the spirit in which those principles were promul-
gated.”). 
113. See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 225–52 
(1986) (discussing the fresh-start policy).  Jackson takes the view that the fresh-start policy applies 
only to individual debtors rather than to non-individual legal entities, such as corporations or part-
nerships.  Id. at 225.  Others, however, take the view that the fresh-start policy plays a role in both 
consumer and business bankruptcies, albeit with greater salience in the consumer context.  See, e.g., 
Lawrence Ponoroff, Vicarious Thrills: The Case for Application of Agency Rules in Bankruptcy 
Dischargeability Litigation, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2515, 2521–22, 2554 & n.155 (1996). 
114. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(a)(2), 727(b), 944(b), 1141(d), 1228, 1328 (2006). 
115. See id. § 109 (setting forth rules for who may be a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code). 
116. For example, consider an individual debtor who files for Chapter 7 relief.  Such a debtor must be 
granted a discharge unless he or she falls within a particular class of individual, generally defined by 
reference to a limited set of congressionally specified circumstances.  See id. § 727(a) (setting forth 
grounds for denial of Chapter 7 discharge).  Hence, the statutory interstices are narrow and tend to 
cabin policymaking discretion.  Similarly, consider a debtor who files for bankruptcy relief under one 
of the chapters involving a repayment plan, such as Chapter 11 and Chapter 13.  If a Chapter 11 
debtor that is a legal entity proposes a repayment plan that satisfies the Code’s substantive require-
ments for plan confirmation, see id. § 1129, such confirmation generally results in an automatic 
discharge, see id. § 1141(d)(1)(A).  If a Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 debtor who is an individual proposes 
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trum of residual policymaking power, it might appear as if Congress has left rel-
atively little room for policymaking as it relates to the bankruptcy discharge itself.117  
Opportunities for courts to engage in significant gap-filling, however, do exist. 
For example, consider the discharge of student loans.118  If repayment of a stu-
dent loan would impose an “undue hardship” on the debtor, the debt is dischargea-
ble.119  Thus, while student loans are not automatically discharged, a debtor may 
obtain a discharge of such debt upon establishing the existence of a financial con-
dition rising to the level of undue hardship.120  Importantly, the Code does not define 
what constitutes undue hardship for purposes of determining the dischargeability 
of a student loan.121  As such, a great deal of residual policymaking inheres in de-
termining the scope of discharge whenever educational debt is at issue.122  Indeed, 
this residual policymaking is precisely the kind that agencies routinely engage in 
and for which they receive Chevron deference from the courts in non-bankruptcy 
  
a confirmable repayment plan, see id. §§ 1129, 1325, the debtor must be granted a discharge once he 
has completed all payments under the plan, provided that certain statutory exceptions do not apply, 
see id. §§ 1141(d)(5)(A), 1328(a). 
117. See, e.g., Douglass G. Boshkoff, Limited, Conditional and Suspended Discharges in Anglo-American 
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 71 (1982) (“[T]he discharge process in the United 
States can be . . . rather inflexible.”). 
118. Another good example of the potential for statutory gap-filling centers around cases involving Chapter 
13 repayment plans.  An individual debtor who fails to complete all payments under a Chapter 13 re-
payment plan may be entitled to a discharge upon a finding, among others, that “the debtor’s failure 
to complete such payments is due to circumstances for which the debtor should not justly be held 
accountable.”  11 U.S.C. § 1328(b)(1).  Referred to as the “hardship discharge,” H.R. REP. NO. 
95-595, at 430 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6386, this form of relief—unlike any 
other discharge provision in the Code—invites inquiry by the court into the cause of the debtor’s fin-
ancial distress and provides a statutory basis for denial of discharge on the basis of financial irre-
sponsibility, see Pardo & Lacey, supra note 111, at 517. 
119. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). 
120. See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1379 (2010) (“[Code] § 523(a)(8) 
requires a court to make a certain finding before confirming the discharge of a student loan debt. . . . 
[T]his requirement is ‘self-executing.’  But that means only that the bankruptcy court must make an 
undue hardship finding even if the creditor does not request one . . . .” (footnote omitted) (citation 
omitted)). 
121. Interestingly, while Code § 523 does not define “undue hardship” for purposes of that section, see 11 
U.S.C. § 523, the Code’s provision regarding reaffirmation agreements sets forth a presumption of 
undue hardship that arises in that context if the debtor’s disposable income is insufficient to make the 
payments specified in the agreement, see id. § 524(m)(1).  It has been argued elsewhere that this 
provision should inform the meaning of undue hardship as it relates to the discharge of student-loan 
debt.  See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 111, at 510–14. 
122. See Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Alternative Structures for Bankruptcy Appeals, 76 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 625, 658 (2002) (noting the results of a questionnaire which showed that judges pointed 
to the undue-hardship standard as one unresolved issue that posed problems for judges); Pardo & 
Lacey, supra note 111, at 411 (“Bemoaning the fact that Congress did not define undue hardship, 
courts have devised a variety of tests aimed at implementing the standard in a more ‘rule-like’ fashion.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
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contexts.  For example, the Fourth Circuit has given Chevron deference to the 
Secretary of Health and Human Service’s interpretation of the statutory term 
“undue hardship” in federal law involving Medicaid.123 
b. Access to the Bankruptcy Forum to Obtain a Discharge 
Congress has also indirectly delegated administration of the fresh-start policy 
by permitting its delegate to have a great deal of discretion in granting access to the 
bankruptcy forum.  Specifically, Congress has created a variety of mechanisms by 
which courts may dismiss bankruptcy cases.  This is quite significant because, 
without access to the bankruptcy forum, the opportunity for bankruptcy relief under 
the fresh-start policy does not exist.124 
First, consider case dismissal for an individual debtor.  An individual debtor—
whether filing for Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 relief—faces the possibility of having 
the case dismissed “for cause.”125  The Code does not define what constitutes cause,126 
but rather provides a non-exhaustive list of factors that could constitute cause for dis-
missal.127  Without specific criteria to demarcate the bounds of “cause,” Congress 
has given courts substantial discretion to develop policy regarding how wide the gate 
to the bankruptcy forum ought to be open.  For example, although unenumerated 
as a “for cause” dismissal factor, courts have deemed lack of good faith to be an ap-
propriate basis for dismissing an individual debtor’s bankruptcy case.128 
  
123. See West Virginia v. Thompson, 475 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2007). 
124. See Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Examination of Access to Chapter 7 Relief by Pro Se Debtors, 26 
EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 5, 19 (2009) (“[D]ismissal of a debtor’s case will dispositively result in the 
failure of the debtor to obtain a discharge and thus bankruptcy’s fresh start.”). 
125. 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(a), 1307(c). 
126. See id. § 101. 
127. In listing illustrative examples constituting cause for dismissal, the Code uses the word “including,” 
id. §§ 707(a), 1307(c), which is a term that is “not limiting,” id. § 102(3). 
128. E.g., Indus. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Zick (In re Zick), 931 F.2d 1124, 1127 (6th Cir. 1991) (concluding 
“that lack of good faith is a basis for dismissal under § 707(a)”); Leavitt v. Sotor (In re Leavitt), 171 
F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Although not specifically listed, bad faith is a ‘cause’ for dismissal 
under § 1307(c).”).  Contra, e.g., Neary v. Padilla (In re Padilla), 222 F.3d 1184, 1193 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“The Bankruptcy Code’s language and the protracted relationship between reorganization debtors 
and their creditors lead us to conclude that bad faith per se can properly constitute ‘cause’ for dismissal 
of a Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 petition but not of a Chapter 7 petition under § 707(a).”).  Similarly, a 
legal entity’s Chapter 11 case may be dismissed if it was not filed in good faith.  E.g., In re SGL 
Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154, 159–60 (3d Cir. 1999).  It has been observed that this “judicially 
imposed” requirement represents “a useful instrument pressed into service by the courts to bring order 
and standards to the business of assuring that bankruptcy policy and purposes evolve in a sensible, pur-
poseful way.”  Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 3, at 923. 
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In addition, for individual debtors whose debts are primarily consumer debts 
and who file for Chapter 7 relief, such individuals face the prospect of having their 
case dismissed on the basis that “the granting of relief would be an abuse.”129  Al-
though the Code does not provide a statutory definition for “abuse,”130 it does estab-
lish a two-tiered framework for determining what constitutes abuse.  First, courts 
should presume abuse if the debtor’s disposable income, as determined pursuant to a 
means-test formula,131 equals or exceeds a specific dollar threshold.132  If the pre-
sumption does not arise or if it is rebutted, then abuse could be deemed to arise on 
the basis of the debtor’s lack of good faith or the totality of the circumstances of the 
debtor’s financial situation.133  Both tiers represent an attempt at stripping discretion, 
the former through a rule-like approach and the latter through a standard-like ap-
proach.134  It has been observed, however, that “by virtue of poor statutory design, both 
mechanisms will prove to be largely unsuccessful in accomplishing what Congress 
sought to achieve.”135  Accordingly, even with the more narrowly constrained pro-
visions regarding case dismissal, a gap-filling function nonetheless exists for courts 
to determine access to the bankruptcy forum. 
c. Implementing and Protecting the Fresh-Start Policy 
In addition to operationalizing the fresh-start policy in the Code’s provisions 
regarding the discharge of debt, Congress has structured the statutory scheme to 
provide relief that either implements or protects that policy.136  One example is the 
automatic stay,137 which immediately takes effect upon the filing of a bankruptcy pe-
  
129. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b).  The “abuse dismissal” in Chapter 7 has aptly been described as a “statutory 
gateway.”  McDow v. Dudley, 662 F.3d 284, 289 (4th Cir. 2011). 
130. See 11 U.S.C. § 101. 
131. The disposable-income calculus set forth in the Code’s means test requires that some of a debtor’s 
expenses be determined by reference to certain monthly amounts specified by the IRS for purposes of 
calculating a delinquent taxpayer’s repayment ability.  See id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I).  It has been ob-
served that “[t]his unusual statutory scheme raises a number of difficult administrative law problems.”  
Stephenson & Hickman, supra note 2, at 2.  The Supreme Court’s opinion in Ransom v. FIA Card 
Services, 131 S. Ct. 716 (2011), however, which was written by Justice Kagan (an administrative law 
scholar), appears to dismiss these concerns.  See id. at 726 n.7. 
132. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i).  For a formalistic reduction of the means-test formula, see Rafael 
I. Pardo, Eliminating the Judicial Function in Consumer Bankruptcy, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 471, 495–
96 (2007). 
133. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3). 
134. See Pardo, supra note 132, at 481. 
135. Id. 
136. See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 111, at 416 n.39. 
137. The Code’s provision allowing a debtor to claim certain property as exempt, see 11 U.S.C. § 522(b), 
constitutes an example of a provision implementing the fresh-start policy by “provid[ing] the debtor 
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tition and enjoins, among other things, creditor attempts to collect prebankruptcy 
debts from the debtor.138  Because of the breathing room it provides to the debtor, 
the automatic stay represents the first step in facilitating a path to relief from the 
financial distress that prompted the debtor to seek respite in the bankruptcy fo-
rum.139  One might be tempted to conclude that Congress did not delegate much 
residual policymaking in this vein by virtue of having incorporated into the statutory 
scheme a legislative injunction that circumscribes a predetermined set of actions.140  
But such a conclusion would ignore, among other things, the following: (1) A court 
may grant the creditor relief from the stay in a variety of forms (including termina-
tion and modification of the stay) and on a variety of grounds;141 and (2) a court 
may award actual damages and, in appropriate circumstances, punitive damages to a 
debtor who has been injured by a willful violation of the stay.142  With respect to stay 
relief, such relief may be granted “for cause,”143 an undefined phrase144 that provides 
a court with the opportunity to make policy regarding how robust the reach of the 
  
no longer burdened with past debts the means to support himself or herself with the aim that the 
fresh start have longevity and vitality.”  Pardo & Lacey, supra note 111, at 416 n.39.  Exemption 
issues have given rise to residual policymaking, including “judicial attempts at regulating the prebank-
ruptcy conversion of nonexempt property to exempt property.”  Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen 
Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert Their Assets on the Eve of Bankruptcy: Villains or Victims of the 
Fresh Start?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 235, 246 (1995); see also Hanson v. First Nat’l Bank in Brookings, 
848 F.2d 866, 870–71 (8th Cir. 1988) (Arnold, J., concurring) (“[A] debtor will be allowed to 
convert property into exempt form, or not, depending on findings of fact made in the court of first 
instance, the Bankruptcy Court, and these findings will turn on whether the Bankruptcy Court re-
gards the amount of money involved as too much.  With all deference, that is not a rule of law.  It is 
simply a license to make distinctions among debtors based on subjective considerations that will vary 
more widely than the length of the chancellor’s foot.”).  The Code’s provision prohibiting discrimi-
nation both during and after a bankruptcy case against the debtor by a governmental unit on the basis 
that the debtor either sought bankruptcy relief, was insolvent, or did not pay a discharged debt, see 11 
U.S.C. § 525(a), constitutes an example of a provision protecting the fresh-start policy.  See Pardo & 
Lacey, supra note 111, at 416 n.39.  For an example of the manner in which residual policymaking has 
inhered in this provision, see FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications Inc., 537 U.S. 293 (2003). 
138. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6). 
139. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340–41 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296–97. 
140. See Jove Eng’g, Inc. v. IRS, 92 F.3d 1539, 1546 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he automatic stay . . . is 
actually a legislative creation with unique properties different from court-ordered injunctions.”); see also 
Sunshine Dev., Inc. v. FDIC, 33 F.3d 106, 113 (1st Cir. 1994) (“Because the automatic stay is exactly 
what the name implies—‘automatic’—it operates without the necessity for judicial intervention.”). 
141. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). 
142. See id. § 362(k)(1). 
143. See id. § 362(d)(1). 
144. See id. § 101.  In listing “lack of adequate protection” as an example of cause for granting relief from 
the automatic stay, the Code uses the word “including,” id. § 362(d)(1), which is a nonlimiting term, 
see id. § 102(3). 
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automatic stay should be.145  With respect to damage awards stemming from stay 
violations, the Code does not define what constitutes a “willful” violation,146 thus 
providing yet another opportunity for a court to define further the contours of the 
automatic stay. 
These kinds of opportunities for judicial interpretation look much less like tra-
ditional statutory interpretation when one considers that agencies frequently inter-
pret ambiguous statutes containing similar words, such as “cause”147 and “willful.”148  
For example, in a non-bankruptcy case involving fireworks licensing, the Third 
Circuit recognized the ambiguity of the phrase “willful” in the statute at issue and 
hence deferred to the relevant agency’s interpretation, noting that “Congress has 
not provided an ‘unambiguously expressed intent’ as to the meaning of ‘willful’” and 
that the agency’s resolution of the ambiguity was reasonable.149 
2. Policymaking Concerning Distributive Policy 
In addition to focusing on the substantive relief afforded to debtors, bank-
ruptcy policy concerns itself with providing an orderly, collective proceeding pur-
suant to which the assets and/or income of the debtor are distributed to creditors.150  
  
145. See, e.g., Christensen v. Tucson Estates, Inc. (In re Tucson Estates, Inc.), 912 F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (noting that, for purposes of relief from the automatic stay, “‘[c]ause’ has no clear defini-
tion and is determined on a case-by-case basis”); Sonnax Indus., Inc. v. Tri Component Prods. Corp. 
(In re Sonnax Indus., Inc.), 907 F.2d 1280, 1288 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that “broad discretion is 
accorded to bankruptcy and district courts” in determining whether cause exists for relief from the 
automatic stay).  In certain circumstances, courts have identified discrete factors relevant to a deter-
mination of whether cause exists for relief from the automatic stay—arguably with the intention of 
providing a structure for implementing the standard in a more rule-like fashion.  See, e.g., Spencer v. 
Bogdanovich (In re Bogdanovich), 292 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Although the term ‘for cause’ 
is not defined in the bankruptcy code, we have adopted 12 factors to consider when deciding whether 
or not to lift a stay in order that litigation may continue to completion in another tribunal.”). 
146. See 11 U.S.C. § 101.  Moreover, in determining whether a stay violation has occurred in the first 
instance (whether willful or not), it must be ascertained whether one of the twenty-eight exceptions 
to the automatic stay applies.  See id. § 362(b)(1)–(28). 
147. See, e.g., United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 246 n.4 (1985) (stating that the courts owe deference 
to the Treasury’s definition of “reasonable cause” under Chevron); Long v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 635 
F.3d 526, 534 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (giving Chevron deference to the Merit Systems Protection Board’s 
interpretation of statutory term “good cause” relating to removal of an administrative law judge). 
148. See Vineland Fireworks Co. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 544 F.3d 509 (3d 
Cir. 2008); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.301(c) (2012) (setting forth the Department of Veterans Affairs’s 
interpretation of the term “willful misconduct”). 
149. Vineland Fireworks Co., 544 F.3d at 517 & n.12. 
150. See Andrew DeNatale & Prudence B. Abram, The Doctrine of Equitable Subordination As Applied to 
Nonmanagement Creditors, 40 BUS. LAW. 417, 418 (1985). 
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Such procedural relief is a direct response to the common pool problem that arises 
when a debtor has insufficient resources to fully repay its debts.151 
Broadly speaking, the Bankruptcy Code efficiently effectuates the shift to a 
compulsory and collective proceeding in the following manner: The filing of a pe-
tition by a debtor simultaneously commences a bankruptcy case;152 creates an estate 
that includes all of the debtor’s legal and equitable interests in property existing as 
of the petition date;153 stays the pursuit of individual remedies by creditors against 
the debtor and the property of its estate;154 and triggers the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
bankruptcy court, through referral from the district court, over the debtor’s case 
and property of the debtor’s estate.155  From this description it should be clear that 
Congress has located administration of bankruptcy’s distributive policy within the 
court system.156 
In fleshing out the details of distributive policy in bankruptcy, Congress has 
had to establish a framework for “determining who gets what, in what order.”157  
Congress, using Chapter 7 liquidation as a baseline, has arranged creditors into dis-
tinct classes for purposes of ascertaining priority for distribution of funds from 
property of the debtor’s estate.158  Because distribution occurs on a pro rata basis by 
class,159 no distribution will be made to creditors who find themselves classified below 
a class for which there are insufficient funds to pay its members in full.160  This 
baseline has been incorporated into other operative provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code for purposes of establishing the amount that should be distributed to credi-
tors.161 
  
151. See JACKSON, supra note 113, at 5, 7–19 (providing a comprehensive analysis of the role of bankruptcy 
as a “collective debt-collection device”). 
152. 11 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006). 
153. Id. § 541(a). 
154. Id. § 362(a). 
155. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a), 1334(a), (e)(1) (2006). 
156. See Sunshine Dev., Inc. v. FDIC, 33 F.3d 106, 114 (1st Cir. 1994). 
157. JACKSON, supra note 113, at 20. 
158. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 725, 726(a); see also id. § 704(a)(1) (requiring trustee to “collect and reduce to money 
the property of the estate”). 
159. See id. § 726(b). 
160. See, e.g., In re Soltan, 234 B.R. 260, 279 n.17 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999); In re Harris, 143 B.R. 957, 
958 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992); cf. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 383 (1977) (“[Code § 726(b) specifies 
that claims within a particular class are to be paid pro rata.  This provision will apply, of course, only 
when there are inadequate funds to pay the holders of claims of a particular class in full.”), reprinted 
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6339. 
161. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7), 1325(a)(4). 
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While Congress has provided a great level of detail in constructing a framework 
for distribution,162 substantial gaps nonetheless exist, thereby opening the door for 
the courts’ residual policymaking.  One example involves whether the future pay-
ments to creditors proposed in a debtor’s repayment plan have a present value equal 
to the amount to which they are entitled on account of their claims.  Although 
Congress has directed courts to engage in present-value analysis as part of the plan 
confirmation process,163 it has not explicitly specified the discount rate itself or the 
method pursuant to which courts should calculate the rate.164  When given the op-
portunity to bring uniformity to the multitude of approaches to present-value analy-
sis that had proliferated within and across circuits subsequent to the Bankruptcy 
Code’s enactment,165 the Supreme Court in Till v. SCS Credit Corp.166 failed to pro-
duce a majority opinion resolving the issue.167  As one commentator has explained, 
the Court’s unsuccessful efforts to settle the question did not involve the Justices 
“giving effect to Congress’s intent so much as forging their own path, guided as 
best they could be by their understanding of the relevant evidence and the likely 
consequences of their decision[].”168  In other words, rather than engaging in tradi-
tional statutory construction, the Justices—faced with an open-ended command for 
courts to discount future payments to their present value—took on a policymaking 
role in defining this aspect of distributive policy.169 
Another prominent example of a gap in the distributional scheme involves 
determination of the price that an individual debtor must pay for a Chapter 13 
discharge—that is, the amount of future income that a debtor must devote to the 
  
162. See, e.g., id. § 507(a) (setting forth the categories of allowed unsecured claims entitled to priority). 
163. See, e.g., id. §§ 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii), 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II), 1129(b)(2)(B)(i), 1325(a)(4), 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). 
164. See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 473 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“The Bankruptcy Code 
provides little guidance as to which of the rates of interest advocated by the four opinions in this case—
the formula rate, the coerced loan rate, the presumptive contract rate, or the cost of funds rate—
Congress had in mind when it adopted the cramdown provision.”).  For an argument in favor of “a 
discount rate that accounts solely for expected inflation, but that does not take into account oppor-
tunity cost or the risk of nonpayment,” see Rafael I. Pardo, Reconceptualizing Present-Value Analysis in 
Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 113, 118, 133–64 (2011). 
165. See, e.g., David G. Epstein, Don’t Go and Do Something Rash About Cram Down Interest Rates, 49 ALA. 
L. REV. 435, 443–59 (1998) (summarizing the various approaches to present-value analysis adopted 
by courts of appeals prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 
520 U.S. 953 (1997)). 
166. 541 U.S. 465. 
167. Id. at 473 (plurality opinion). 
168. Lemos, supra note 8, at 434. 
169. Cf. KENNETH N. KLEE, BANKRUPTCY AND THE SUPREME COURT 242 (2008) (noting that “the 
[Supreme] Court does its best to interpret the Bankruptcy Code in a manner consistent with fun-
damental bankruptcy policies”). 
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repayment of unsecured claims.  Claim repayment in Chapter 7 is asset based,170 
requiring a debtor to relinquish all property in which he had a “legal or equitable 
interest[]” prior to filing for bankruptcy (that is, property of the estate),171 other 
than property that the debtor can claim as exempt.172  In contrast, claim repayment 
in Chapter 13 is income based,173 requiring a debtor to devote his future income to 
repay creditor claims (but allowing him to retain all property of the estate).174  The 
difference in claim repayment under the two chapters has been described as “the basic 
chapter 13 bargain.”175 
Part of that bargain requires a Chapter 13 debtor to devote all of his “projected 
disposable income” to repay the claims of unsecured creditors if he cannot fully repay 
them.176  To ascertain that amount, the Bankruptcy Code first requires a determi-
nation of the debtor’s “disposable income,”177 which the Code defines as the dif-
ference between (1) a debtor’s current monthly income, which generally consists of 
the debtor’s average monthly income over the six months preceding his or her bank-
ruptcy filing;178 and (2) the debtor’s reasonably necessary expenses,179 which include 
  
170. See 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1) (2006) (requiring a trustee to “collect and reduce to money the property of 
the estate”); id. § 726(a) (arranging creditors into distinct classes for purposes of ascertaining priority 
entitlement to distribution from property of the estate). 
171. See id. § 541(a)(1).  Such property does not include the debtor’s future income.  See id. § 541(a)(6) 
(excluding from property of the estate “earnings from services performed by an individual debtor 
after the commencement of the case”). 
172. See id. § 522(b). 
173. However, it need not be exclusively so.  See id. § 1322(a)(8) (authorizing a debtor to use prebankruptcy 
assets, in addition to future income, to repay creditor claims). 
174. See id. §§ 1306(a)(2), 1306(b), 1327(b). 
175. David Gray Carlson, Modified Plans of Reorganization and the Basic Chapter 13 Bargain, 83 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 585, 585–86 (2009). 
176. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B). 
177. Id. § 1325(b)(2). 
178. Id. § 101(10A)(A). 
179. Id. § 1325(b)(2)(A)–(B).  It should be noted that much residual policymaking inheres in the deter-
mination of the debtor’s reasonably necessary expenses.  For any debtor whose current monthly 
income is less than or equal to the state median income for a family size comparable to that of the 
debtor’s household, the Code does not provide a framework for calculating such expenses, with the 
result that courts have broad latitude in conducting this standard-like determination.  See, e.g., 
Schultz v. United States, 529 F.3d 343, 348 (6th Cir. 2008).  For any debtor whose current 
monthly income is greater than the state median income for a family size comparable to that of the 
debtor’s household, the Code requires that the debtor’s reasonably necessary expenses be calculated 
by reference to the expense amounts set forth in Chapter 7’s formulaic means test.  See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1325(b)(3).  Such expenses include certain monthly amounts specified by the IRS for purposes 
of calculating a delinquent taxpayer’s repayment ability.  See id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I).  Even under 
these constraints, courts have had an opportunity to formulate distributive policy.  See, e.g., Ransom 
v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 721 (2011) (“We must determine whether [an above-
median Chapter 13] debtor . . . who owns his car outright, and so does not make loan or lease 
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expenses “for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the 
debtor.”180  After a Chapter 13 debtor’s disposable income has been determined, 
the question becomes whether the debtor’s repayment plan devotes all “projected 
disposable income” to the repayment of unsecured claims.  By failing to define that 
term, however, Congress delegated discretion to courts to shape distributive policy 
in bankruptcy by defining the relationship between the defined term (disposable 
income) and the undefined term (projected disposable income).181 
C. The Frequency of Judicial Policymaking 
Having demonstrated that a significant degree of residual policymaking in-
heres in the judiciary’s administration of the Bankruptcy Code, the question re-
mains of how often bankruptcy judges might be called upon to decide disputes that 
involve residual policymaking.  To contextualize the scale of dispute resolution 
that occurs in bankruptcy, one must take account of the procedural distinctions in 
the types of disputes that arise in a bankruptcy case.  The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 
Procedure (the “Bankruptcy Rules”) divide disputes into one of two categories: (1) 
adversary proceedings and (2) contested matters.  Adversary proceedings resemble 
other federal lawsuits insofar as Part VII of the Bankruptcy Rules governing such 
proceedings virtually incorporates (with occasional modification) the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.182  The Bankruptcy Rules classify only ten dispute types as adver-
sary proceedings.183  If a dispute cannot be classified as an adversary proceeding, it 
is deemed to be a “contested matter”184 and proceeds according to less complex 
procedures than an adversary proceeding—including request for relief by motion 
rather than the filing of a complaint.185  Given the increased complexity of an adver-
  
payments, may claim an allowance for car-ownership costs (thereby reducing the amount he will 
repay creditors).”). 
180. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(A)(i). 
181. See Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2469 (2010) (“We granted certiorari to decide how a 
bankruptcy court should calculate a debtor’s ‘projected disposable income.’  Some lower courts have 
taken what the parties term the ‘mechanical approach,’ while most have adopted what has been called 
the ‘forward-looking approach.’”). 
182. See FED. R. BANKR. P. pt. VII. 
183. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001.  Examples include (subject to certain exceptions) any proceeding to 
recover money or property, FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(1), to object to or revoke a discharge, FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 7001(4), and to determine the dischargeability of a debt and to determine the dis-
chargeability of a debt, FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(6). 
184. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(a). 
185. See Khachikyan v. Hahn (In re Khachikyan), 335 B.R. 121, 125 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (“In a 
contested matter, there is no summons and complaint, pleading rules are relaxed, counterclaims and 
third-party practice do not apply, and much pre-trial procedure is either foreshortened or dispensed 
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sary proceeding, such a proceeding presents a greater opportunity—relative to the 
resolution of a contested matter—for policymaking. 
The volume of docket activity in the bankruptcy courts demonstrates that 
bankruptcy judges do have ample opportunity to engage in dispute resolution.  For 
example, during the 2009 and 2010 fiscal years, there were respectively 55,530 and 
69,917 adversary proceedings commenced in the bankruptcy courts.186  It is certainly 
not the case that a judge resolved each of these adversary proceedings.  Quite the 
contrary, prior trends would suggest that most of the proceedings settled.187  None-
theless, a decreasing trial rate in adversary proceedings does not undermine our claim 
regarding the opportunity for policymaking by bankruptcy judges. 
First, even a 5 percent trial rate188 results in a nontrivial number of adversary 
proceedings resolved by judges.189  Second, the decreasing trial rate may stem from 
the tendency of bankruptcy judges to be actively involved in case management, with 
respect to a debtor’s underlying bankruptcy case as well as adversary proceedings 
within the case.190  If such “managerial judging” has the effect of encouraging set-
  
with in the interest of time . . . .”).  Some of the procedural rules governing adversary proceedings, 
however, equally apply in contested matters.  See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(b). 
186. DUFF, supra note 103, app. at 299 tbl.F-8.  To place these figures in perspective, they are approxi-
mately between one-fifth and one-quarter of the number of all civil cases commenced in U.S. District 
Courts during the same time periods: respectively, 276,397 and 282,895 civil cases.  Id. app. at 138 
tbl.C.  Also, the number of adversary proceedings commenced during the 2009 and 2010 fiscal years 
pales in comparison to the number of bankruptcy cases, see supra notes 34–48 and accompanying text 
(describing the nature of a bankruptcy case), commenced in U.S. Bankruptcy Courts during the same 
periods: respectively, 1,402,816 and 1,596,355 bankruptcy cases.  DUFF, supra note 103, app. at 
292 tbl.F. 
187. See Elizabeth Warren, Vanishing Trials: The New Age of American Law, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 915, 
930 (2005) (finding that, while 16 percent of all adversary proceedings went to trial in 1985, the trial 
rate had dropped to 5 percent by 2002). 
188. See id. 
189. The possibility exists, however, that the resolution of such proceedings is not evenly distributed 
across bankruptcy cases.  Douglas Baird and Edward Morrison, for example, have found the distri-
bution of adversary proceedings filed in business bankruptcy cases to be skewed because adversary 
proceedings are clustered in a few cases.  See Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Adversary 
Proceedings in Bankruptcy: A Sideshow, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 951, 957 (2005); cf. Robert M. Lawless, 
Are Bankruptcy’s Trials Vanishing? If So, Who Cares?, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 995, 1002 (2005) (noting 
that bankruptcy trials may become “centralized in a few places with the rest of the court system 
dealing principally with unlitigated, more routine matters”).  If adversary proceedings are concentrated 
in a few cases, then the possibility exists that such proceedings will not be evenly distributed across 
judges.  See, e.g., W.D. WASH. LOCAL BANKR. R. 1073-1, available at http://www.wawb.uscourts.gov/ 
read_file.php?file=3269 (providing that adversary proceedings are generally assigned to the judge to 
whom the underlying bankruptcy case has already been randomly assigned). 
190. See Stacy Kleiner Humphries & Robert L.R. Munden, Painting a Self-Portrait: A Look at the 
Composition and Style of the Bankruptcy Bench, 14 BANKR. DEV. J. 73, 76, 82, 105 (1997) (reporting 
findings from an empirical study based on survey data from approximately 71 percent of active 
bankruptcy judges that, in business bankruptcy cases, “the bankruptcy judges’ self-reported general 
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tlement,191 the judicially influenced outcome will represent a form of privatized 
policymaking.192  Finally, adversary proceedings likely represent a fraction of the 
overall pool of disputes subject to resolution by the bankruptcy judge.  The number 
of contested matters arising in bankruptcy cases undoubtedly eclipses the number of 
adversary proceedings by an order of magnitude.193  Even if the overwhelming ma-
jority of contested matters settle, the combination of non-settled adversary proceed-
ings and contested matters constitutes a substantial number of instances for judicial 
resolution and its concomitant policymaking. 
In sum, Congress has given courts primary interpretive authority over the 
Code, which contains substantial gaps.  Although scholars often say that courts fill 
these gaps by using traditional tools of statutory construction to discern Congress’s 
intent, we have demonstrated that courts have ample opportunity to engage in re-
sidual policymaking by resolving ambiguities in the Code that Congress either 
intentionally or inadvertently did not resolve.  Accordingly, we now turn to a 
discussion of some of the consequentialist concerns that flow from this court-
centered model of bankruptcy administration. 
II. PROBLEMS POSED BY THE CURRENT STRUCTURE  
OF BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION 
Congress’s decision to create a court-centered model of bankruptcy admin-
istration raises both constitutional questions and softer policy-driven questions con-
cerning the current model’s structure.  This Part explores these questions, starting 
with the constitutional questions and then turning to various softer policy-driven 
concerns of institutional competence that are drawn from administrative law’s lessons. 
  
style . . . indicated clear and significant support for managerial judging”); see also Baird & Morrison, 
supra note 189, at 966. 
191. See E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 
323–26 (1986). 
192. Such privatized settlement may, however, be publicly available through the Public Access to Court 
Electronic Records (PACER) system, http://www.pacer.gov.  See, e.g., Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle 
R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 179, 212–13 (2009). 
193. See Randall J. Newsome, Vanishing Trials—What’s the Fuss All About?, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 973, 
975 (2005) (stating that contested matters “encompass[] a great portion of the activity in both business 
and non-business [bankruptcy] cases,” and noting that, “[a]ccording to the [Administrative Office of 
the U.S. Courts], there were 509,458 relief from stay motions filed in the twelve-month period ending 
June 30, 2004”). 
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A. Pure Constitutional Issues 
The current model of bankruptcy administration has raised numerous consti-
tutional questions.  For example, some scholars have previously questioned whether 
the current model violates the Uniformity Clause of the Constitution,194 whether the 
uncontested nature of many bankruptcy cases raises Article III “case or controversy” 
issues,195 and whether the method of appointing bankruptcy judges is constitu-
tional.196  We, however, focus our attention on three constitutional issues that clearly 
highlight the need to reassess the current structure of bankruptcy administration: (1) 
Article III issues concerning the bankruptcy courts, (2) separation of powers issues 
relating to the removal of BAs, and (3) the nondelegation doctrine.  We have picked 
  
194. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4 (providing that Congress has the power to enact “uniform Laws on the 
subject of Bankruptcies”).  See generally Randolph J. Haines, The Uniformity Power: Why Bankruptcy 
Is Different, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 129, 196 (2003) (discussing the Uniformity Clause and arguing 
that “the uniformity described by the Framers in the Bankruptcy Clause was a substantive power 
granted to Congress, not a limitation”).  One specific Uniformity Clause issue that has arisen is 
whether the existence of both the BA Program and the UST Program, which split their powers along 
geographic lines, violates the Uniformity Clause.  See St. Angelo v. Victoria Farms, Inc., 38 F.3d 
1525, 1535 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that parallel BA and UST Programs violated the Uniformity 
Clause and remedying the violation by striking down the BA Program).  But see Dan J. Schulman, 
Constitutionality of the United States Trustee/Bankruptcy Administrator Programs, 4 J. BANKR. L. & 
PRAC. 319, 329 (1995) (noting the unenforceability of the Ninth Circuit’s decision given that the 
BA Program “functions solely in six districts located within the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits” and is 
“not present in the Ninth Circuit”).   If, as some have argued, the Uniformity Clause is best understood 
as a power granted to Congress rather than a limitation, see, e.g., Haines, supra, at 196, then arguments 
that the coexistence of the BA and UST Programs is unconstitutional would seem to fail. 
195. See, e.g., Robert E. DeMascio, For Fourteen Years . . . , in FOURTEEN YEARS OR LIFE: THE 
BANKRUPTCY COURT DILEMMA 1, 6 (Nat’l Legal Ctr. for the Pub. Interest ed., 1983) (“[L]imited 
as it would be to actual ‘cases or controversies,’ an Article III bankruptcy court could not handle the 
myriad administrative work generated by the great bulk of bankruptcy filings.”); Martin H. Redish & 
Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the Case-or-Controversy Requirement, and the Nature 
of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 587 n.157 (2006) (discussing “case or controversy” 
issues that potentially inhere in bankruptcy proceedings).  But see, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, Ripeness 
of Government Action for Judicial Review, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1122, 1123–24 (1955) (pointing to 
various examples of situations in which the federal courts act despite the lack of a dispute between 
two opposing parties, such as criminal cases in which the defendant pleads guilty or bankruptcy 
cases in which “all parties affected are in agreement”); Frank R. Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Court, in 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF BANKRUPTCY & REORGANIZATION LAW IN THE COURTS OF THE 
SECOND CIRCUIT OF THE UNITED STATES 3, 5 (1995) (“No serious challenge based on the ‘case-
or-controversy’ limitation on Article III has ever developed in reported cases or commentary re-
garding the constitutionality of the exercise of administrative functions in bankruptcy cases by 
bankruptcy courts, district courts, or the federal appellate courts.”). 
196. See Tuan Samahon, Are Bankruptcy Judges Unconstitutional? An Appointments Clause Challenge, 60 
HASTINGS L.J. 233, 234, 295 (2008) (arguing that bankruptcy judges, “who are powerful officers,” 
might be deemed principal officers who can constitutionally be appointed only by the President with 
the advice and consent of the Senate, and not by courts). 
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these three issues in part because the first issue has new salience in light of the Court’s 
2011 opinion in Stern v. Marshall 197 and because the other two issues have evaded 
scholarly attention. 
1. Article III Issues Concerning the Bankruptcy Courts 
Perhaps the most obvious (and most frequently noted and discussed) consti-
tutional question flowing from the current system of bankruptcy administration is 
the constitutionality of the bankruptcy courts.  Specifically, the issue involves Article 
III questions concerning what types of matters non–Article III bankruptcy courts 
can decide.198  Central to the debate is the Supreme Court’s fractured opinion in 
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,199 in which the Court 
“considered whether bankruptcy judges serving under the Bankruptcy Reform Act 
of 1978—appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, but lacking the 
tenure and salary guarantees of Article III—could ‘constitutionally be vested with 
jurisdiction to decide [a] state-law contract claim’ against an entity that was not 
otherwise part of the bankruptcy proceedings.”200  The Court ultimately conclud-
ed that the assignment of such claims to bankruptcy judges violated Article III.201  
In reaching this conclusion, the plurality opinion written by Justice Brennan ac-
knowledged that the Court had upheld the constitutionality of “legislative courts 
and administrative agencies created by Congress to adjudicate cases involving 
‘public rights.’”202  Justice Brennan concluded that the rights at issue in the case, 
however, were not public rights.  Although he declined to give a precise definition 
of public rights, he noted that “public rights must, at a minimum, arise ‘between the 
government and others.’”203  With respect to bankruptcy, the Court noted (with-
out deciding the matter) that the “restructuring of debtor–creditor relations, which 
is at the core of the federal bankruptcy power, must be distinguished from the adju-
  
197. 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011); see also Troy A. McKenzie, Getting to the Core of Stern v. Marshall: History, 
Expertise, and the Separation of Powers, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 23, 44–45 (2012) (“The teaching of Stern, 
apparently, is that the federal judiciary faces more danger of encroachment by the political branches 
when the non–Article III adjudicator is a bankruptcy court than when it is an administrative agency.”). 
198. See generally, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Blue Collar Constitutional Law, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 3, 4–5 
(2012) (discussing the impact of Stern v. Marshall on bankruptcy jurisdiction); Ralph Brubaker, A 
“Summary” Statutory and Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy Judges’ Core Jurisdiction After Stern v. 
Marshall, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 121 (2012) (same); McKenzie, supra note 197 (same). 
199. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
200. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609–10 (quoting N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 87 n.40 (plurality opinion)). 
201. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 87 (plurality opinion). 
202. Id. at 67. 
203. Id. at 69 (quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)). 
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dication of state-created private rights, such as the right to recover contract damag-
es;” and that while “[t]he former may well be a ‘public right,’ . . . the latter obviously 
is not.”204 
Congress responded to Northern Pipeline by restructuring the bankruptcy 
courts in 1984.  The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 
(BAFJA)205 provided that the judges of the reconstituted bankruptcy courts would 
be appointed by the U.S. Courts of Appeals and would only have the authority to 
enter final judgments in core proceedings,206 subject to normal appellate review 
under “the usual limited appellate standards.”207  In contrast, for a non-core pro-
ceeding otherwise related to a case under the Bankruptcy Code, the bankruptcy 
judge would only submit findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court, 
allowing the district court to enter a final judgment after reviewing de novo any mat-
ter to which a party objects.208 
After Congress implemented this fix, the Supreme Court decided a few non-
bankruptcy cases involving the constitutionality of non–Article III adjudications 
carried out by administrative agencies.  Most notably, in Thomas v. Union Carbide 
Agricultural Products Co.,209 the Court addressed a federal statutory scheme involving 
data-sharing between companies that were required to provide the research data 
for registration of a pesticide with the Environmental Protection Agency.210  The 
federal statute provided that disputes about compensation relating to data sharing 
between the companies would be decided by binding arbitration, and the Court 
held that the scheme did not violate Article III.  Specifically, the Court held that 
“Congress, acting for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its constitutional powers 
under Article I, may create a seemingly ‘private’ right that is so closely integrated 
into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution 
with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary.”211 
Similarly, in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,212 the Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s 
(CFTC’s) exercise of jurisdiction to decide a state law counterclaim raised by a cus-
  
204. Id. at 71. 
205. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 and 28 U.S.C.). 
206. See supra notes 104–106 (discussing core proceedings). 
207. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2611 (2011). 
208. Id. at 2604. 
209. 473 U.S. 568 (1985). 
210. Id. at 568. 
211. Id. at 593–94. 
212. 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
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tomer against a broker in the context of a reparations proceeding.213  In upholding 
the scheme, the Court looked to a variety of factors, such as the fact that the CFTC’s 
orders (unlike the bankruptcy court’s orders at issue in Northern Pipeline) would be 
enforceable only by order of the district court and the fact that the parties initially 
consented to the CFTC’s adjudication of the matter.214  Perhaps most interesting, 
however, was the Court’s willingness to sanction the traditional model of agency 
adjudication.  Specifically, the Court stressed that the CFTC’s adjudicatory pow-
ers “depart[ed] from the traditional agency model in just one respect: the CFTC’s 
jurisdiction over common law counterclaims.”215  The Court found this “single de-
viation” from the traditional agency model allowable, in part, because “Congress 
intended to create an inexpensive and expeditious alternative forum through which 
customers could enforce the provisions of the [Commodities Exchange Act] against 
professional brokers.”216  Hence, whereas Northern Pipeline took a narrow reading 
of the permissibility of non–Article III adjudicators in the bankruptcy context, Schor 
and Thomas took much more liberal approaches to the permissibility of non–Article 
III adjudicators when faced with more traditional regulatory schemes involving 
agencies. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall highlights this tension 
between the Court’s Article III jurisprudence in traditional administrative agency 
cases versus its treatment of bankruptcy cases.217  In Stern, the Court addressed the 
constitutionality of the scheme for adjudicating bankruptcy matters established by 
BAFJA, assessing whether a bankruptcy court could constitutionally be vested with 
jurisdiction to render a final judgment in a core proceeding that involved a debtor’s 
state law tortious interference counterclaim.218  In the majority opinion written by 
Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held that the district court could not constitu-
tionally decide the state law counterclaim.  In so holding, the Court rejected the 
notion that the counterclaim could “be deemed a matter of ‘public right’ that c[ould] 
be decided outside the Judicial Branch” by the bankruptcy courts.219  Specifically, the 
Court noted that even though the public rights exception is not limited to actions 
involving the government as a party, the Court has continued “to limit the exception 
  
213. Id. at 835–36, 841–42.  Interestingly, even though the reparations proceeding itself involved a dispute 
between two private parties (that is, the customer and the broker), the Court noted that the “repara-
tions scheme itself is of unquestioned constitutional validity.”  Id. at 856. 
214. Id. at 849–56. 
215. Id. at 852. 
216. Id. at 852, 855. 
217. See supra note 197. 
218. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2610–11 (2011). 
219. Id. at 2611. 
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to cases in which the claim at issue derives from a federal regulatory scheme, or in 
which the resolution of the claim by an expert government agency is deemed essential 
to a limited regulatory objective within the agency’s authority.”220  The Court went 
on to note that it dealt “here not with an agency but with a court, with substantive ju-
risdiction,” and that this was “not a situation in which Congress devised an ‘expert 
and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are par-
ticularly suited to examination and determination by an administrative agency spe-
cially assigned to that task.’”221  Instead, what was involved, according to the Court, 
was “the most prototypical exercise of judicial power: the entry of a final, binding 
judgment by a court with broad substantive jurisdiction, on a common law cause of 
action, when the action neither derives from nor depends upon any agency regula-
tory regime.”222 
Hence, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion highlights the fact that Congress’s 
decision to place bankruptcy adjudication in the courts, rather than in an administra-
tive agency, raises Article III concerns.  In addition, Stern—when viewed alongside 
the Court’s willingness in Schor and Thomas to condone agency adjudication of even 
traditional common law claims—suggests a potential path for minimizing Article 
III concerns and making bankruptcy less exceptional: Instead of vesting adjudica-
tory power in the courts, Congress might empower an agency to administer the 
bankruptcy laws and thereby attempt to align bankruptcy within the “public rights” 
model.223 
2. Separation-of-Powers Issues Relating to the Appointment  
and Removal of BAs 
Another constitutional issue surrounding the current system of bankruptcy 
administration involves separation-of-powers issues relating to the BAs.  Specifi-
cally, this potential constitutional flaw—which has gone unnoticed by scholars—
involves questions about the appointment and removal process specified for BAs. 
The legislation creating the BA Program in North Carolina and Alabama 
provides that BAs may be appointed “under regulations issued by the Judicial 
Conference” to act as bankruptcy administrators.224  The Judicial Conference, in 
  
220. Id. at 2613 (emphasis added). 
221. Id. at 2615 (emphasis added) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932)). 
222. Id. 
223. This possibility is explored in infra Part III.B.2. 
224. See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
No. 99-554, § 302(d)(3)(I), 100 Stat. 3088, 3123 (amended 1990 and 2000). 
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turn, has promulgated regulations that allow the federal courts of appeals to appoint 
BAs to five-year terms for districts within North Carolina and Alabama.225   
Although Congress provided that BAs are to be appointed pursuant to Judicial 
Conference regulations rather than expressly calling for the courts to appoint the 
BAs,226 the method specified by the JCUS for appointing BAs—appointment by 
the courts of appeals—seems constitutionally permissible if BAs are inferior rather 
than principal officers.227  In determining which officers are inferior rather than 
principal, the Court has looked to whether the officer is empowered to perform only 
certain, limited duties, whether the officer is limited in jurisdiction and tenure, and 
whether the officer is subject to removal by a higher official.228  Applying these fac-
tors, BAs—assuming they are officers rather than mere employees229—seem to be 
inferior rather than principal officers given that they are appointed to limited five-
year terms and that their jurisdiction is geographically constrained.230  Hence, the 
method of appointment seems permissible.   
Much more troubling, however, is the method of removal that the JCUS has 
specified for BAs.  The problem lies in the fact that the Judicial Conference regula-
tions provide that the court of appeals can remove a BA before the expiration of his 
five-year term only for cause, such as incompetence or misconduct.231  In turn, the 
circuit court judges who may remove BAs enjoy lifetime appointment and may only 
be removed via impeachment.232  In other words, both BAs and the circuit court 
judges who may remove them enjoy significant job security and insulation from 
  
225. See 9 JCUS REG., supra note 76, §§ 230.10, 250.70. 
226. See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act § 302(d)(3)(I), 
100 Stat. at 3123. 
227. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that inferior officers may be appointed by the courts of law). 
228. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671–72 (1988) (holding that the independent counsel was an 
inferior officer because, inter alia, the independent counsel was removable for cause by the Attorney 
General and enjoyed limited jurisdiction and tenure).   
229. The test for determining whether one is an officer subject to the Appointments Clause rather than 
a mere employee asks whether the appointee exercises “significant authority pursuant to the laws of 
the United States.”  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976); see also Myers v. United States, 272 
U.S. 52 (1926) (finding a postmaster first class to be an inferior officer subject to the Appointments 
Clause); Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 225 (1839) (finding the clerk of a district court to be 
an inferior officer within the meaning of the Appointments Clause).  Applying Buckley’s significance 
test, BAs seem to qualify as officers given that they exercise significant executive powers.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 238–239. 
230. Cf. Stanley v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 653, 659–60 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that a UST—if an officer 
at all—is clearly an inferior officer, not a principal officer, because the “position was limited geograph-
ically, temporally, and topically”). 
231. See 9 JCUS REG., supra note 76, § 230.20 (“Only the appointing court of appeals may remove a 
bankruptcy administrator from office before his or her term expires.  Incompetence, misconduct, 
neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability are grounds for removal.”). 
232. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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presidential control.  This double-layer of insulation between the President and 
BAs seems highly problematic in light of the Court’s decision in Free Enterprise 
Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).233   
In Free Enterprise, the Court split 5–4 and held unconstitutional an arrange-
ment pursuant to which members of the PCAOB were removable only for cause by 
members of the SEC, whom the Court in turn assumed to be removable by the 
President only for cause.  In striking down this “double for-cause” removal arrange-
ment, the majority opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts stressed that the 
PCAOB, which had the power to promulgate auditing and ethics standards and to 
initiate formal investigations and disciplinary proceedings, possessed executive 
power.234  Although the Court had previously allowed one layer of tenure protection 
between the President and an officer possessing executive power, the Court held 
that two layers of tenure protection were impermissible because such a double layer 
of protection “withdraws from the President any decision on whether that good 
cause exists.”235  In other words, the decision whether to remove the PCAOB mem-
bers was “vested instead in other tenured officers—the [SEC] Commissioners—
none of whom is subject to the President’s direct control,” leading to a Board “that 
is not accountable to the President, and a President who is not responsible for the 
Board.”236  In short, the Court decreed that “[b]y granting the Board executive power 
without the Executive’s oversight, th[e] Act subverts the President’s ability to ensure 
that the laws are faithfully executed—as well as the public’s ability to pass judgment 
on his efforts.”237 
This reasoning relating to double for-cause removal provisions—if applied to 
the removal of BAs—would seem to lead to the conclusion that the current method 
of removing BAs is unconstitutional.  BAs exercise significant executive powers, 
including enforcement of the bankruptcy laws and control over certain bankruptcy 
professionals.238  For example, in exercising their enforcement powers and acting as 
watchdogs in the bankruptcy system, BAs may move for the conversion or dismissal 
of a Chapter 7 case or move for the denial or revocation of a Chapter 7 discharge if 
the debtor has not complied with the law.239  Yet BAs are removable only for cause 
by circuit court judges, who enjoy lifetime tenure and can only be removed via im-
peachment.  Under the reasoning of Free Enterprise, this is problematic because the 
  
233. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
234. Id. at 3148, 3159. 
235. Id. at 3153. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. at 3155. 
238. See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text. 
239. See supra note 86, 91–92. 
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President—as a result of the double layer of tenure protection—lacks the authority 
to ensure that the bankruptcy laws are faithfully executed in judicial districts subject 
to BA oversight. 
One possible distinction between the double layer of tenure protection sur-
rounding the PCAOB and the double layer surrounding BAs is that Free Enterprise, 
according to the Court, presented “an even more serious threat to executive control 
than an ‘ordinary’ dual for-cause standard” given that “Congress enacted an unu-
sually high standard that must be met before Board members may be removed.”240  
Under the Act, for example, the SEC would not even have the power “to fire Board 
members for violations of other laws that do not relate to the Act, the securities laws, 
or the Board’s authority.”241  Nonetheless, the Court’s opinion in Free Enterprise 
used very broad language that might well be read to reach all double for-cause situa-
tions.  Furthermore, even though the cause standard that speaks to the removability 
of BAs is easier to meet than the cause standard that governed PCAOB’s members, 
the removal standards that apply to the circuit court judges who appoint BAs are much 
more stringent than the removal standards in an ordinary for-cause scenario.  This 
is because such judges—unlike the members of the SEC at issue in Free Enterprise—
cannot be removed by the President for cause, but rather can be removed from office 
only via impeachment. 
3. The Nondelegation Doctrine 
A final constitutional question surrounding the current structure of bankruptcy 
administration involves the nondelegation doctrine.  The nondelegation doctrine 
flows from Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution, which provides that “[a]ll legis-
lative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.”242  
For close to two hundred years, the Supreme Court has interpreted this provision in 
the Constitution “to prohibit Congress from delegating its legislative power and has 
equated legislative power with policymaking.”243  This interpretation is largely based 
on notions of political accountability, which seek to “ensur[e] that the most demo-
cratic branch conducts our lawmaking.”244 
  
240. Free Enter., 130 S. Ct. at 3158. 
241. Id. 
242. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
243. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 7 (2008). 
244. Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 
26 (2011). 
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In its current form, the nondelegation doctrine prohibits Congress from dele-
gating policymaking power unless Congress first sets forth an “intelligible prin-
ciple” to guide and cabin the delegated discretion.245  However, the intelligible 
principle requirement has actually been quite toothless.  Indeed, the Supreme Court 
has found the requisite intelligible principle lacking in only two cases, both involving 
delegations in the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933.246  Indeed, the Court 
has routinely found the intelligible principle satisfied even when Congress includes 
only very vague statutory standards, such as delegations to regulate in the “public 
interest”247 or to regulate what is “fair and equitable.”248 
If the nondelegation doctrine were to be applied to the current structure of 
bankruptcy administration, it seems unlikely that any constitutional infirmities 
would be found.  There are several reasons why.  First, although the nondelegation 
doctrine has played a longstanding role in the context of congressional delegations of 
rulemaking power to agencies, it “has been largely absent when it comes to delega-
tions of lawmaking power to the courts.”249  There is good reason to argue that this 
should change.  For example, Margaret Lemos has demonstrated that “there is no 
persuasive basis on which to exempt delegations to courts from the constitutional 
restrictions that apply to delegations to agencies”250 given that ambiguities in court-
administered statutes call for a degree of policymaking by courts, just as ambiguities 
in agency-administered statutes call for a degree of policymaking by agencies.251  
Yet little attention overall has been given to the question of whether the constitu-
tional principles underlying the nondelegation doctrine should apply with full force 
to delegations to courts,252 and hence applying the doctrine to these delegations 
would require expanding the doctrine into new territory. 
Second, even if the nondelegation doctrine were applied in the bankruptcy 
context to assess the constitutionality of Congress’s delegation of policymaking pow-
ers to courts, the minimal demands posed by the nondelegation doctrine would 
  
245. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. 
United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (“If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible 
principle to which the person or body authorized to [regulate] is directed to conform, such legislative 
action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”). 
246. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541–42 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. 
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 414–20 (1935). 
247. See, e.g., Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943); United States v. Rock Royal 
Coop., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 576–77 (1939). 
248. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420 (1944). 
249. Watts, supra note 244, at 28. 
250. See Lemos, supra note 8, at 443. 
251. Id. at 433–34. 
252. Id. at 435. 
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seem easily met.  Congress’s delegations of policymaking power to courts—giving 
courts, for example, the power to define what “undue hardship” means in the context 
of discharging student-loan debt253 or what actions will be deemed “willful” viola-
tions of an automatic stay in bankruptcy254—seem to set forth a sufficiently intelli-
gible principle to guide courts’ discretion. 
Nonetheless, even though the nondelegation doctrine does not seem to pose 
constitutional problems per se for Congress’s decision to delegate bankruptcy policy 
to the courts, the nondelegation doctrine should not be dismissed out of hand.  In 
the administrative law world, courts have routinely condoned relatively standardless 
delegations of policymaking authority to agencies (and have been willing to give 
the nondelegation doctrine no more than lip service) because of functionalist con-
siderations that make agencies well suited to receive and exercise delegations of 
policymaking power.  These considerations include agencies’ relative expertise, ac-
countability, flexibility, accessibility, and their ability to achieve uniformity.255  These 
aspects of agencies’ institutional structures and capacities suggest that broad dele-
gations of policymaking power to agencies might well be desirable.256  But the same 
functional considerations may not support Congress’s decision to delegate poli-
cymaking to courts.  In other words, the institutional advantages and disadvantages 
of courts relative to agencies should be taken into account when considering whether 
delegations to courts make sense.  The next Subpart addresses this issue in the bank-
ruptcy context by discussing how various functional and institutional considerations 
on balance do not favor Congress’s decision to delegate bankruptcy policymaking 
power to courts. 
B. Softer Questions of Institutional Design Drawn From Administrative 
Law’s Lessons 
Administrative law teaches that broad delegations of policymaking power to 
agencies may well be desirable—and, hence, will generally be tolerated as a consti-
tutional matter—because of a variety of functional considerations relating to agen-
cies’ institutional structures and capacities.  These functional considerations include 
the expertise that many agencies enjoy in specialized areas of the law, the fact that 
  
253. See supra notes 118–123 and accompanying text. 
254. See supra notes 142, 146, 148–149 and accompanying text. 
255. See Lemos, supra note 8, at 445, 447. 
256. Id. at 444 (“A growing body of commentary argues that broad delegations to agencies are not just 
something to be tolerated, but something to be desired.  Pro-delegation commentators offer func-
tional arguments in defense of agency lawmaking, focusing on institutional characteristics of agencies 
that make them valuable partners in the lawmaking enterprise . . . .”). 
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agencies are politically accountable as a result of political control exerted over agen-
cies by the President and Congress, the accessibility and transparency of agencies’ 
rulemaking proceedings, the prospective clarity that occurs when agencies set forward-
looking policy via rulemaking, the uniformity that agencies can bring to specific 
areas of the law, and the degree of flexibility that agencies can exercise when re-
sponding to changing circumstances or facts.257  As this Subpart demonstrates, 
however, these same functional considerations do not tip in favor of Congress’s de-
cision to delegate policymaking power in the bankruptcy arena to courts.  Indeed, 
far from justifying Congress’s court-centered model of bankruptcy administration, 
these functional considerations call into question the wisdom of Congress’s choice of 
delegate. 
1. Expertise 
One of the main factors supporting congressional delegations of broad poli-
cymaking power to agencies is that agencies possess specialized expertise.258  But 
while agencies are viewed as experts, judges are mostly viewed as generalists259 who 
“lack the ability to focus single-mindedly on a particular field (or subfield) in the 
same way that agencies do.”260 
Congress did avoid relying solely on generalist Article III judges in the current 
structure of bankruptcy administration by authorizing the creation of specialized, 
non–Article III bankruptcy judges to administer the Bankruptcy Code.261  Much 
like how specialized administrative agencies are experts in their own fields, bank-
  
257. See Lemos, supra note 9, at 365; Lemos, supra note 8, at 445, 447. 
258. See, e.g., Lemos, supra note 8, at 445 (“One of the most common defenses of delegation to agencies is 
that agencies possess technical expertise that Congress lacks.”); see also Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti 
K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 33 (2008) (“[O]ne 
of the central rationales for creating administrative agencies was that they would have greater expertise 
and focus than generalist legislatures or courts.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New 
Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 440–41 (1987) (suggesting that the increase in grants of authority to 
regulatory agencies during the New Deal was motivated in part by a conception of administrative 
agencies as “technically sophisticated”). 
259. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (noting 
that “[j]udges are not experts” when compared to specialized administrative agencies); Richard W. 
Murphy, A “New” Counter-Marbury: Reconciling Skidmore Deference and Agency Interpretive Freedom, 
56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 40 (2004) (“[C]ourts are relatively ill-suited to the task of policymaking—
judges are generalists who gather information through the incomplete, skewed process of litigation.”); 
Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 
1111, 1111 (1990) (“The federal judiciary at the Article III level is predominantly generalist . . . .”). 
260. Lemos, supra note 8, at 446. 
261. See 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(2) (2006). 
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ruptcy judges are “expert in bankruptcy law.”262  Bankruptcy judges derive their ex-
pertise from a variety of sources.  First, a bankruptcy judge is very likely to have 
been a bankruptcy practitioner—or, at a minimum, to have had a business law 
background—prior to ascending to the bench.263  Second, a bankruptcy judge’s 
law clerk may have previously been a bankruptcy practitioner.264  Finally, a bank-
ruptcy judge will develop specialized expertise in the course of deciding myriad 
bankruptcy matters during his fourteen-year term, which can be renewed.265  
Congress’s establishment of the bankruptcy courts might thus be seen as helping 
to ensure valuable expertise in the bankruptcy arena—just as administrative agencies 
ensure expertise in the administrative law sphere. 
The reality, however, is that expert bankruptcy judges merely decide issues at the 
trial level, and these decisions lack any kind of precedential effect.266  Furthermore, 
because such decisions may be appealed and because the conclusions of law therein 
are reviewed de novo on appeal,267 ultimate policymaking power does not rest with the 
expert bankruptcy judges but rather with those judges exercising appellate review—
most of whom lack any specialized expertise in bankruptcy.  Specifically, as Figure 1 
below illustrates, three different appellate paths exist when a core proceeding is at 
issue.  And, although one path calls for appellate review by judges who are experts in 
bankruptcy, the other two paths involve appellate review by generalist judges. 
 
  
262. See Bussel, supra note 109, at 1086. 
263. See Ralph R. Mabey, The Evolving Bankruptcy Bench: How Are the “Units” Faring?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 
105, 123 (2005). 
264. See id. at 113–16 (discussing the trend among bankruptcy judges to hire career clerks (as opposed to 
term clerks) and noting that those bankruptcy judges who preferred career clerks often hired clerks 
with legal experience, and in particular practice experience in bankruptcy law). 
265. See 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (providing that bankruptcy judges are appointed for a term of fourteen 
years); Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 303, 110 Stat. 3847, 3852 
(“When filling vacancies, the court of appeals may consider reappointing incumbent bankruptcy 
judges under procedures prescribed by regulations issued by the [JCUS].”); cf. Mabey, supra note 263, 
at 107 (noting that, of the 115 bankruptcy judges who left the bench in the decade prior to 2005, only 
ten did so as a result of not being reappointed). 
266. See, e.g., In re 400 Madison Ave. Ltd. P’ship, 213 B.R. 888, 890 n.2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating 
that the decision of one bankruptcy judge in a multijudge bankruptcy court was not binding on the 
other bankruptcy judges); In re Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley, Myerson & 
Casey, 160 B.R. 882, 898 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (same); In re Jones, 112 B.R. 975, 977 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mo. 1989) (stating that the decision of a bankruptcy court from one district is not binding on 
a bankruptcy court from another district). 
267. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
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FIGURE1. Federal Bankruptcy Appellate Structure for Core Proceedings 
 
First, as Path 1 depicts, a party may appeal to the district court from the spe-
cialized bankruptcy court.268  A party may then appeal to the court of appeals269 and 
finally to the Supreme Court via the discretionary writ of certiorari.270 
Second, as Path 2 depicts, rather than appealing to the district court from the 
bankruptcy court, a party may appeal to a bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) if the cir-
cuit judicial council has established one.271  A BAP consists of a panel of three 
bankruptcy judges.272  The BAP automatically hears appeals from the bankruptcy 
court unless a party timely files an election to have the appeal heard by the district 
  
268. 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(1). 
269. See id. § 158(d)(1). 
270. See id. § 1254(1). 
271. See id. § 158(b)(1).  Currently, the First, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have operating 
BAPs.  See Nash & Pardo, supra note 41, at 1757. 
272. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1), (c)(1). 
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court.273  From the BAP, a party may appeal to the court of appeals274 and from there 
to the Supreme Court.275 
Finally, as Path 3 depicts, appellate review of a bankruptcy court’s decision can 
involve direct appeal from the bankruptcy court to the court of appeals—with the 
effect of bypassing the first tier of intermediate appellate review (that is, the district 
court or the BAP).  An appeal may proceed directly to the court of appeals pursuant 
to a certification procedure if one of the following circumstances exists: (1) The 
appeal involves a question of law unresolved by the court of appeals for the circuit or 
by the Supreme Court; (2) the appeal involves a matter of public importance; (3) 
the appeal involves a question of law requiring resolution of conflicting decisions; or 
(4) the appeal may materially advance the progress of the case or proceeding in 
which the appeal is taken.276  From the court of appeals (that is, from the second tier 
of intermediate appellate review), a party may seek discretionary and final review by 
the Supreme Court.277 
Hence, only Path 2 draws on specialized expertise at the first level of appellate 
review by relying on a panel of bankruptcy judges.278  In contrast, judicial review of 
bankruptcy court decisions along Paths 1 and 3 will not involve specialized courts 
with institutional bankruptcy expertise since neither the federal district courts nor 
the courts of appeals possess—or have the inclination to develop—bankruptcy ex-
pertise at an institutional level.279  This is true for a variety of reasons.  First and 
foremost, district court judges do not hear a sufficient number of bankruptcy appeals 
to develop bankruptcy expertise over time,280 and the courts of appeals and the 
  
273. See id. § 158(c)(1). 
274. See id. § 158(d)(1). 
275. See id. § 1254(1). 
276. See id. § 158(d)(2)(A).  For a detailed discussion of the use of this appellate path, see Laura B. Bartell, 
The Appeal of Direct Appeal—Use of the New 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2), 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 145 (2010). 
277. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). 
278. See supra notes 262–265 and accompanying text. 
279. Of course, individual judges and Justices may have bankruptcy expertise by virtue of their experiences 
prior to joining the bench.  Two circuit court judges come to mind: the Honorable Edith H. Jones 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the Honorable Sidney R. Thomas of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, both of whom were bankruptcy practitioners before becoming 
judges.  See Douglas K. Moll, “Less Is More”: An Interview With Edith Hollan Jones, U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, HOUS. LAW., Nov./Dec. 2001, at 42, 42; John Schwartz, Long Shot for 
Court Has Reputation for Compassion and Persuasion, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2010, at A17.  As for the 
Supreme Court, Justice William Douglas is the most prominent example.  See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., 
DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 109 (2001). 
280. See McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 122, at 627.  Exceptions may occur, however, when a district 
court limits—pursuant to internal operating procedures—the pool of judges who may hear bankruptcy 
appeals.  See id. at 650.  One such example has been the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of Florida, which randomly assigns bankruptcy appeals to one of three judges in a bankruptcy appellate 
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Supreme Court hear significantly fewer bankruptcy appeals than the district courts.281  
Moreover, when Article III judges do have the opportunity to decide bankruptcy 
appeals, they may not find such matters interesting,282 which may lead to suboptimal 
decisionmaking.283 
Of course, even in the traditional agency model, generalist Article III judges 
can review agency decisions on questions of law,284 and this layer of generalist review 
does not defeat or negate agency expertise in the administrative law world.  But there 
is a fairly clear reason that generalist judges’ review of agency action does not defeat 
agency expertise: Article III courts generally review agency interpretations of ambig-
uous statutes under deferential standards rather than de novo.  For example, in his 
now famous Chevron decision, Justice Stevens—pointing to the fact that judges are 
“not experts”285—described how courts must defer to an agency’s reasonable inter-
pretation of ambiguity in the statute administered by the agency: 
If . . . the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise 
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction 
  
pool.  In re Assignment of Bankruptcy Appeals, Admin. Order No. 2011-61 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2011), 
available at http://www.flsd.uscourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/adminOrders/2011/2011-61.pdf; see 
also S.D. FLA. LOCAL BANKR. R. 87.4(a), available at http://www.flsd.uscourts.gov/wp-content/ 
uploads/2011/12/FINALDecember2011LocalRules.pdf (“Appeals from orders or judgments entered 
by the Bankruptcy Court shall generally be assigned in accordance with the Court’s Internal Operating 
Procedures.”). 
281. See infra notes 352–355 and accompanying text. 
282. See New Jersey v. Reading Co., 451 U.S. 918, 918 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari) (“Bankruptcy cases seldom receive much notice outside of those who are familiar with this 
branch of the law . . . .”); KLEE, supra note 169, at 38–40 (discussing the Justices’ lack of interest in 
bankruptcy cases); DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BROOKINGS INST., BANKRUPTCY: 
PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 157 (1971) (referring to district “judges’ lack of familiarity with and 
interest in bankruptcy law and procedure” when hearing a bankruptcy appeal); Troy A. McKenzie, 
Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts, 62 STAN. L. REV. 747, 791–92 (2010) 
(discussing “the disinclination of Article III courts toward matters arising from the bankruptcy 
courts”).  The referral of bankruptcy appeals by district judges to magistrate judges may be concrete 
evidence of such disinterest.  See, e.g., Hall v. Vance, 887 F.2d 1041, 1045–46 (10th Cir. 1989) 
(determining that referral was proper); Minerex Erodel, Inc. v. Sina, Inc. 838 F.2d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 
1988) (holding that referral was improper). 
283. Cf. McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 122, at 678 (“There is anecdotal evidence that circuit judges 
find the BAP decisions they review better reasoned and the cases better prepared for review than 
decisions from the district courts, and that this impression is independent of the likelihood of af-
firmance or reversal.”). 
284. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (noting that both case law and the 
Administrative Procedure Act support a presumption in favor of judicial review of agency action); 
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Leventhal, J., concurring) (“Congress 
has been willing to delegate its legislative powers broadly and courts have upheld such delegation 
because there is court review to assure that the agency exercises the delegated power within statutory 
limits . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
285. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
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on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative 
interpretation.  Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect 
to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s 
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.286 
Thus, courts are not to second guess agencies’ reasonable interpretations of the 
statutes they administer, thereby “allocat[ing] primary interpretive authority 
to . . . agenc[ies] rather than the courts.”287 
In contrast, legal issues in bankruptcy are reviewed de novo on appeal.288  
Hence, although the possibility of de facto deference exists pursuant to which an 
appellate court might choose to defer to the rationale of an expert bankruptcy judge 
or expert BAP,289 no formal deference doctrines operate in the bankruptcy context 
as a matter of law to ensure that the reviewing courts give weight to the expert bank-
ruptcy judges’ policy determinations.  At least one Supreme Court Justice has com-
mented on this structural difference between bankruptcy courts and agencies, 
noting that even though no deference “is required with respect to decisions on the 
law made by bankruptcy judges,” courts are “admonished to give substantial defer-
ence to [an administrative] agency’s interpretation of the statute it is enforcing.”290 
Further complicating matters is the fact that the system’s three hundred plus 
bankruptcy judges are not the only ones with expertise in the bankruptcy arena.  To 
the contrary, some expertise may also rest with USTs and BAs.  Even though these 
agencies generally lack the power to issue controlling constructions of the Bankruptcy 
Code that would warrant Chevron deference,291 courts might nonetheless give their 
  
286. Id. at 843 (footnote omitted). 
287. See Watts, supra note 6, at 1004–05. 
288. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
289. See, e.g., SNTL Corp. v. Ctr. Ins. Co. (In re STNL Corp.), 571 F.3d 826, 829 (9th Cir. 2009) (per 
curiam) (“We adopt the BAP opinion as our own and attach it as an appendix to this opinion.” 
(citation omitted)); Wehrle v. City of Akron (In re Akron Thermal, Ltd. P’ship), No. 5:10CV0953, 
2010 WL 2991516, at *2 (N.D. Ohio July 27, 2010) (“Having carefully reviewed the record, the 
applicable law and the parties’ briefs, and entertained oral argument, this Court adopts the bank-
ruptcy court’s thorough and well-reasoned [opinion] that correctly sets out the facts and includes 
citations to the relevant statutes and caselaw.”); McKenzie, supra note 282, at 778–79 (describing how 
deference to bankruptcy judges might be seen as implicit in the Bankruptcy Code’s open-textured 
instructions). 
290. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 (1982) (White, J., dissenting). 
291. Some cases have acknowledged that the EOUST might possess, in certain narrow contexts, the power 
to authoritatively construe statutory ambiguities in a way that commands Chevron deference, or, at 
a minimum, in a way that receives Skidmore deference.  See Foulston v. BDT Farms, Inc. (In re BDT 
Farms, Inc.), 21 F.3d 1019, 1023 (10th Cir. 1994) (giving Chevron deference to the EOUST’s 
permissible interpretation of a statutory provision involving a standing trustee’s compensation); see 
also Bolen v. Dengel (In re Dengel), 340 F.3d 300, 310 (5th Cir. 2003) (giving Skidmore deference); 
In re Jackson, 321 B.R. 94, 96–97 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2005) (same).  These cases are of limited reach, 
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views some weight pursuant to so-called Skidmore deference, which rests on the per-
suasiveness of the agency’s views.292  This possibility is corroborated by a 2008 study, 
which noted that when bankruptcy cases reach the Supreme Court, the Solicitor 
General’s office frequently relies on the EOUST’s views in drafting its briefs.293  
Even though there is “no Bankruptcy Commission” and, hence, no agency to which 
the Court can formally defer, the analysis set forth in the Solicitor General’s briefs 
“often influences the Court’s judgment in ways that resemble Skidmore deference.”294 
In short, although bankruptcy judges and BAPs clearly possess expertise in the 
bankruptcy arena, policymaking does not rest solely in their hands.  Rather, when 
litigants appeal matters from the bankruptcy courts or BAPs, generalized Article 
III appellate judges have the ultimate power to issue precedents deciding questions 
of law de novo.  Furthermore, the fact that there are hundreds of bankruptcy judges—
as well as BAs and USTs—suggests that subject-matter expertise in bankruptcy is 
highly diffuse and polyphonic, with no single institution serving as the clear locus of 
expertise.295 
In thinking about why this lack of expert-driven policymaking in the bank-
ruptcy system is highly problematic, it might be helpful to consider a concrete 
example of the type of policy question that experts equipped to handle empirical 
and economic analyses could best resolve.  Here, consider the Bankruptcy Code’s 
mandate that courts determine the present value of the stream of future payments  
 
  
however, because they involve a specific statutory provision found outside the Bankruptcy Code 
that expressly provides that the “Attorney General . . . shall fix . . . a maximum annual compensa-
tion . . . and . . . a percentage fee” for standing trustees.  28 U.S.C. § 586(e)(1)(A)–(B) (2006) 
(emphasis added); see also Buckley, supra note 88, at 260 (describing BDT Farms as limited precedent 
because “Chevron deference was given to Trustee policy-making with respect to an administrative, 
not a substantive matter” and because the “statutory ambiguity opening the door to policy-making 
by the Trustee was not in the Bankruptcy Code itself”).  Hence, these cases deal with the rare exam-
ples of areas in which the EOUST has in fact been delegated the power to fill in statutory gaps. 
292. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (providing that even agency interpretations that 
do not control the courts, such as views set forth in an interpretive bulletin or amicus briefs, may 
“constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly 
resort for guidance” based on the persuasiveness of the agency’s views). 
293. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of 
Agency Statutory Interpretations From Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1113 (2008). 
294. Id. 
295. Cf. Christopher W. Frost, Bankruptcy Redistributive Policies and the Limits of the Judicial Process, 74 
N.C. L. REV. 75, 132 (1995) (“A second institutional feature of the bankruptcy process that limits 
its competence to resolve distributional questions is that bankruptcy courts act on an uncoordinated 
basis.  The economic effect of redistributive decisions made by any one bankruptcy judge may be small 
in comparison to the aggregate, economy-wide effect of decisions made by all judges.”). 
Bankruptcy Administration 431 
 
proposed in a debtor’s repayment plan.296  As previously discussed, this mandate 
requires a court to determine the discount rate that it will use to conduct present-
value analysis, but the Code remains silent on the rate itself and the method for de-
termining it.297  Given that courts take into account considerations such as expected 
inflation, opportunity cost, and the risk of nonpayment when determining the 
discount rate,298 the calculus is inherently forward looking and thus necessitates 
acquiring information about future events and conditions.  The adversarial nature of 
litigation and the retrospective orientation of adjudication, however, make courts 
an ill-suited delegate to engage in such inquiry.299   
A better approach would involve generating data and studies pursuant to 
which a more holistic and coherent policy for determining discount rates could be 
set—something that agencies are better suited for than courts.300  Such coherence has 
particular salience given the widespread nature of the problem.  Because discount-
ing in bankruptcy is implicated in every case involving a repayment plan, such as 
Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 cases,301 the substantial scale of this issue becomes 
readily apparent when one considers the number of cases filed and the dollar amounts 
involved each year—to wit, in Chapter 13 cases, “it seems reasonable to hypothesize 
that the amount at stake on an annual basis is at least a quarter of a billion dollars.”302 
  
296. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7), (a)(9), (a)(15)(A), (b)(2)(A)(i)(II), (b)(2)(B)(i), (b)(2)(C)(i), 
1325(a)(4), (a)(5)(B)(ii) (2006). 
297. See supra notes 163–164 and accompanying text. 
298. See, e.g., Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 474 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
299. See Pardo, supra note 164, at 185; cf. Frost, supra note 295, at 133 (“Judges do not look broadly at the 
direction they and their fellow judges are taking the economy.  Even if judges attempted to develop 
a sense of the economy-wide effect of their collective views on bankruptcy redistributions, it is 
unlikely that they would have any reliable means of determining the causal relationship between their 
individual redistributive policies and particular economic phenomena.  Judges and the lawyers prac-
ticing before them are not necessarily economists and statisticians.  They often lack both the train-
ing and the resources to conduct the analyses required to determine the economic effects of such 
decisions.”). 
300. This is not to say that an agency-centered approach is a panacea.  Discounting issues can be quite 
difficult to resolve, even in the agency context.  See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, 
Cost–Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 948 (1999) (“A 
central goal of this Article is to move the regulatory process towards a more thoughtful valuation of 
human lives threatened by environmental carcinogens, and away from OMB’s deeply flawed tech-
nique of taking valuations from the workplace setting and reducing them by an inflated discount 
rate.”).  Nonetheless, we take the view that, given the institutional differences between courts and 
agencies, courts are the second-best policymaking delegate when it comes to issues like discount rates. 
301. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (indicating who may file a Chapter 11 plan); id. § 1321 (providing that a 
Chapter 13 debtor shall file a plan). 
302. Pardo, supra note 164, at 118. 
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2. Accountability 
Another reason frequently given for allowing administrative agencies to engage 
in policymaking when filling the gaps in statutes relates to political accountability.303  
Although agency heads are not directly accountable to the voters, they are indirectly 
accountable because of both presidential and congressional control.304  Congress, for 
example, has the power to create agencies, to control their budgets, and to hold 
oversight hearings.305  In addition, the President has the power to appoint and remove 
certain agency officials.306  The President also exerts control over agencies and their 
policies through informal jawboning,307 the issuance of Executive Orders,308 and 
regulatory review conducted by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
located within the Office of Management and Budget.309 
Admittedly, not all agencies are subject to the same kind of political control.  
For example, although the heads of executive agencies are subject to the President’s 
unfettered removal power, the heads of so-called independent agencies, such as the 
SEC and the Federal Reserve Board, are not.310  Nonetheless, as Justice Scalia recent-
ly pointed out, even independent agencies that are insulated from direct presidential 
control are not insulated from politics or from congressional control.311 
  
303. See, e.g., Lemos, supra note 8, at 448 (“Supporters of the . . . hands-off approach to delegations to 
agencies also maintain that agencies are democratically accountable, at least derivatively, because of their 
relationship with the president and Congress.”); Watts, supra note 244, at 34 (“Political accountability 
and oversight are two of the most significant checks on agency discretion.”); Kathryn A. Watts, 
Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 35 (2009) (noting that 
political control and accountability help legitimize agencies). 
304. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 64 (2006); 
Philip J. Harter, Executive Oversight of Rulemaking: The President Is No Stranger, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 
557, 568 (1987). 
305. See Watts, supra note 244, at 34; see also Beermann, supra note 304, at 72, 84–85, 122. 
306. See Watts, supra note 244, at 34–35. 
307. See Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 
COLUM. L. REV. 943, 944–47 (1980). 
308. See, e.g., Regulatory Planning and Review, Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 
1993) (setting forth principles and requirements for agencies to follow relating to regulatory planning 
and review), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 745 (2006). 
309. See id. at 51,737 (describing the role of the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs). 
310. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. 
REV. 599, 600 (2010) (“The President cannot fire the members of these agencies for political reasons, 
including failure to follow administration policy, but only for ‘good cause,’ such as neglect of duty or 
malfeasance in office.”). 
311. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1815 (2009) (“[I]ndependent agencies are 
sheltered not from politics but from the President, and it has often been observed that their freedom 
from presidential oversight (and protection) has simply been replaced by increased subservience to 
congressional direction.”). 
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Hence, our federal regulatory agencies—whether executive or independent—
are subject to a fair amount of political oversight and control, and it is precisely this 
political control that has helped justify Congress’s delegations of broad policymak-
ing powers to agencies.312  For example, prominent scholars like Jerry Mashaw have 
argued that, in light of presidential elections, “it may make sense to imagine the dele-
gation of political authority to administrators as a device for improving the respon-
siveness of government to the desires of the electorate.”313 
In contrast, the Article III judges exercising the authority to fill gaps in the 
Bankruptcy Code through the appeals process are not politically accountable.  Ra-
ther, they enjoy lifetime tenure and salary protections that help insulate them from 
political control and accountability.314  Furthermore, the bankruptcy judges who act 
as trial judges in the bankruptcy system face little political accountability.  Bankruptcy 
judges are appointed by circuit court judges rather than by the President,315 through 
a selection process that shelters bankruptcy judges “from day-to-day politics [even 
more] than the Article III judges who survive the Constitution’s nakedly political 
appointment process.”316  Once appointed, they serve for lengthy fourteen-year, 
renewable terms, and they can be removed earlier only for cause.317  Accordingly, 
judges who are generally autonomous and sheltered from politics318 fill in substan-
tive gaps in the Code, calling into question the legitimacy of the policymaking role 
that Congress has delegated to courts.   
Indeed, outside the bankruptcy context, the Chevron Court recognized the 
concerns that might flow from allowing unaccountable judges to reconcile com-
peting political interests and to make policy calls:  
Judges are not . . . part of either political branch of the Government.  
Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but 
not on the basis of the judges’ personal policy preferences.  In contrast, 
  
312. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 81, 95–99 (1985). 
313. Id. at 95. 
314. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their 
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, 
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”). 
315. See 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (2006). 
316. McKenzie, supra note 282, at 794. 
317. See 28 U.S.C. § 152(e). 
318. See, e.g., McKenzie, supra note 282, at 795 (“If the primary value we attach to Article III is adjudication 
before a neutral decisionmaker who does not owe allegiance to a political patron for continued 
employment, it seems well served by the current structure of appointment to the bankruptcy courts.”); 
see also Nash & Pardo, supra note 41, at 1766 (“While judicial independence may be fostered by life 
tenure, the renewable, fourteen-year term of bankruptcy judges effectively allows them to serve as long 
as many of their Article III counterparts.”). 
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an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibili-
ties may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the in-
cumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments.  
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief 
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the 
Government to make such policy choices—resolving the competing in-
terests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or inten-
tionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration 
of the statute in light of everyday realities.319 
The Court recognized that policy calls, which necessarily turn on the resolution of 
competing interests, are best handled by politically accountable agencies and not by 
unaccountable judges. 
At its core, bankruptcy frequently turns on resolving political judgments about 
the distribution of losses and the rights of creditors and debtors.320  James Madison 
noted this in the Federalist Papers when he categorized the creditor–debtor divide as 
a “common and durable source of faction[]” necessitating government regulation.321  
Given that bankruptcy policy involves difficult political judgments about distribu-
tive policies, bankruptcy presents a prime example of a situation in which allowing 
Congress to delegate policymaking powers to unaccountable judges, rather than to 
an administrative agency subject to political oversight and control, raises serious 
concerns. 
3. Uniformity 
In addition to citing agencies’ expertise and accountability, scholars frequently 
support agencies’ policymaking role by citing their ability to achieve national regu-
latory uniformity.322  The thought is that “by committing ambiguous statutory 
provisions to executive [rather than judicial] interpretation, courts reduce the like-
lihood that circuit splits will cast a pall of uncertainty over unitary regulatory 
  
319. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984). 
320. See generally Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987). 
321. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 55 (James Madison) (Harvard Univ. Press 2009); cf. Hamilton v. 
Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2483 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Bankruptcy protection is not a 
birthright . . . . How long to wait before throwing the debtor a lifeline is inherently a policy choice.”); 
Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, Does Ideology Matter in Bankruptcy? Voting Behavior on the 
Courts of Appeals, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 919, 927 (2012) (“[T]o the extent that the argument 
is that bankruptcy is essentially devoid of issues over which judges divide ideologically, we flatly 
disagree.”). 
322. See Revesz, supra note 259, at 1114 (“[O]ne of the traditional reasons for creating administrative 
agencies is to produce a uniform interpretation of federal statutes.”). 
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programs.”323  Agencies achieve this uniformity by adopting consistent, nationally 
applicable interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions via notice-and-
comment rules or formal adjudication that the courts must subsequently defer to 
under Chevron.324 
In contrast to the agency model, the current court-centered model of bank-
ruptcy administration depends on a multitude of courts at various levels to interpret 
ambiguities in the Bankruptcy Code; such a model is ill-equipped to achieve uni-
formity.325  Indeed, scholars have frequently criticized the current system of bank-
ruptcy administration for failing to “build a coherent body of law.”326  There are 
various issues in bankruptcy law—even basic issues—that lawyers must “litigate 
again and again” because of a lack of precedent to resolve the issues uniformly.327  
This lack of uniformity has affected judges: A Federal Judicial Center study found 
support for “the proposition that bankruptcy law is less settled than in other areas of 
law—and that it affects judges’ work.”328  Specifically, the study reported that district 
court judges were “less likely to find sufficient precedent in bankruptcy than in other 
areas of the law.”329 
At least three different aspects of the current model of bankruptcy admin-
istration seem to be contributing to this overall lack of uniformity.  One factor is the 
odd geographic split of power between the UST and BA Programs.  Both agencies 
are designed to serve as watchdogs and to bring civil enforcement actions in the 
bankruptcy arena,330 but the agencies and the enforcement policies and strategies 
that they advocate for in their own geographic jurisdictions may not always align.331  
Furthermore, even the narrow areas of bankruptcy law that the USTs and BAs are 
authorized to administer, such as the approval of financial counseling entities,332 lack 
  
323. Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1291 (2008). 
324. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred and Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s 
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1121 (1987). 
325. See McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 122, at 635 (“The bankruptcy system is not structured to serve 
the law-declaration functions of an appellate system.”). 
326. Barbara B. Crabb, In Defense of Direct Appeals: A Further Reply to Professor Chemerinsky, 71 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 137, 140 (1997). 
327. Paul M. Baisier & David G. Epstein, Resolving Still Unresolved Issues of Bankruptcy Law: A Fence or an 
Ambulance, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 525, 526–27, 527 n.9 (1995); see also Crabb, supra note 326, at 140 
(“Many of the most basic issues in bankruptcy law have no definitive resolution.”). 
328. McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 122, at 655. 
329. Id. 
330. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
331. Cf. J. Christopher Marshall, Civil Enforcement: An Early Report, J. NAT’L ASS’N BANKR. TRUSTEES, 
Fall 2002, available at http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/public_affairs/articles/docs/nabtalkfall2002.pdf 
(describing the UST Program’s civil enforcement initiatives). 
332. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text. 
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uniformity.  For example, in 2006, the EOUST issued interim rules defining the 
criteria and procedures to be used regarding applications for approval of such enti-
ties,333 and then in 2008 it issued proposed rules to replace the interim rules.334  It is 
unclear, however, whether the EOUST has the authority to promulgate such 
rules,335 and the rules have not been finalized.  In contrast, the BA Program has not 
promulgated any formal rules, but it has issued instructions clarifying the applica-
tion process and criteria for applicants, which can be found on the website for the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.336 
Second, in the absence of any administrative agency with substantive rulemak-
ing powers, courts have seized on their local rulemaking powers, leading to the 
proliferation of non-uniform judicial rules.  To illustrate this phenomenon, consider 
the example already discussed regarding present-value analysis.  Recall that the 
Bankruptcy Code requires a court to discount to present value the stream of future 
payments to be made under a debtor’s repayment plan, albeit without expressly 
specifying the discount rate itself or how to calculate it.337  Further recall that, when 
given the opportunity to decide the proper approach to the discount-rate calculus, 
the Supreme Court in Till v. SCS Credit Corp.338 failed to muster a majority opinion 
and thus did not definitively resolve for bankruptcy courts the proper approach to 
present-value analysis.339  The Court’s failure to announce a rule with nationwide 
effect has given bankruptcy courts the leeway to continue a practice, which they 
  
333. See Application Procedures and Criteria for Approval of Nonprofit Budget and Credit Counseling 
Agencies and Approval of Providers of a Personal Financial Management Instructional Course by 
United States Trustees, 71 Fed. Reg. 38,076 (July 5, 2006) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 58). 
334. See Application Procedures and Criteria for Approval of Providers of a Personal Financial Management 
Instructional Course by United States Trustees, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,435 (proposed Nov. 14, 2008) (to be 
codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 58); Application Procedures and Criteria for Approval of Nonprofit Budget 
and Credit Counseling Agencies by United States Trustees, 73 Fed. Reg. 6062 (proposed Feb. 1, 
2008) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 58). 
335. Although the Bankruptcy Code expressly gives USTs (and BAs) the authority to “approve” counseling 
and instructional course providers, see 11 U.S.C. § 111(b)–(d) (2006), nothing in the Code specifically 
gives USTs or BAs rulemaking powers in this arena.  Perhaps rulemaking powers could be inferred 
from language in the statute that states that “[t]o be approved by the United States trustee (or the 
bankruptcy administrator, if any), a nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency shall, at a minimum,” 
meet certain statutorily defined criteria.  Id. § 111(c)(2) (emphasis added). 
336. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Approval Process for Credit Counseling and Debtor Education 
Courses, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/federalcourts/bankruptcy/bankruptcyresources/ 
approvalprocessforcreditcounseling.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2012) (providing instructions and ap-
plication form). 
337. See supra notes 163–164 and accompanying text. 
338. 541 U.S. 465 (2004). 
339. See supra notes 165–167 and accompanying text. 
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began prior to Till,340 of fashioning their own approaches to administering the Code’s 
present-value provision.  Although the courts are clearly trying to make the Chapter 
13 plan confirmation process more efficient and hopefully uniform (within their 
respective districts) by adopting presumptively appropriate discount rates, the end 
result has been disquieting because the courts are using their local rulemaking pro-
cesses to enact rules or to promulgate official forms that affect substantive rights.  
Such rules, which may well contravene the limits imposed by the Rules Enabling 
Act,341 create inter-district non-uniformity with regard to the amount of present-
value interest that a debtor must pay to have a confirmable Chapter 13 plan. 
Take, for example, the District of Hawaii, the District of South Carolina, the 
Southern District of California, and the Western District of Missouri.  Through 
their local rules and/or forms, these districts have substantively created a presump-
tion of what the appropriate discount rate should be in Chapter 13.342  The pre-
sumptive rate is currently 3.69 percent in the Western District of Missouri,343 4.75 
percent in the District of Hawaii,344 5.25 percent in the District of South Carolina,345 
and 7 percent in the Southern District of California.346  The variability in these 
seemingly arbitrary rates is problematic when one considers that the differences 
  
340. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Smithwick (In re Smithwick), 121 F.3d 211, 213 (5th 
Cir. 1997), overruled by Drive Fin. Servs., L.P. v. Jordan, 521 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2008). 
341. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071(a), 2075 (2006). 
342. D. HAW. LOCAL BANKR. R. 3015-1(g)(1) (“[T]he clerk will set and publish a standard interest rate 
applicable to secured and other claims under a confirmed Chapter 13 plan.  The setting of a standard 
interest rate does not bar a debtor or creditor from proposing a different interest rate.”); D.S.C. 
LOCAL BANKR. R. 3015-6(a) (“In order to expedite the determination of an effective interest rate to 
be used by debtors in meeting the requirement of 11 U.S.C. § 1325, a presumed effective interest rate 
(‘Periodic Interest Rate’) will be set by the Court with the assistance of a committee of trustees and 
members of the consumer bar.  If applied to a secured claim in a chapter 13 plan, there will be a 
rebuttable presumption that the Periodic Interest Rate—for plan confirmation purposes—is reasona-
ble.”); W.D. MO. LOCAL BANKR. R. 3084-1(g)(1), (3) (“The posted ‘CHAPTER 13 RATE’ shall 
be determined by the standing Chapter 13 trustee for the Western District of Missouri semi-
annually . . . . The posted Chapter 13 rate is, absent evidence to the contrary, presumed to be the applicable 
rate.”); U.S. BANKR. COURT FOR THE S. DIST. OF CAL., CHAPTER 13 PLAN (RECOMMENDED 
FORM) ¶ 5 (2005), available at http://www.casb.uscourts.gov/html/csdforms/Chapter13Plan.pdf 
(providing that, for claims secured by personal property, “[e]ach named creditor shall be paid in 
installments . . . until claim is paid in amount allowed secured plus interest at seven percent (7%) per 
annum unless a different percentage is specified”). 
343. Richard Fink, Chapter 13 Trustee, Kansas City, Mo., 13NETWORK.COM, http://www.13network.com/ 
kschome.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2012). 
344. U.S. BANKR. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF HAW., NOTICE OF STANDARD INTEREST RATE FOR 
CHAPTER 13 PLANS (2012), available at http://www.hib.uscourts.gov/news/2012_0601_Ch%2013% 
20Interest.pdf. 
345. In re Interest Rate in Chapter 13 Cases, Amended Operating Order No. 09-02 (Bankr. D.S.C. Nov. 
20, 2009), available at http://www.scb.uscourts.gov/pdf/oporder/opor09-02.pdf. 
346. See supra note 342. 
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cannot be attributed to any geographical variance in inflation, opportunity costs, or 
the risk of nonpayment.347  Hence, all else being equal, debtors subject to a higher 
discount rate must pay more to creditors to obtain Chapter 13 relief.  This is just 
one example of policymaking by courts via their local rulemaking powers that creates 
non-uniformity and presents cause for serious concern.348 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the current appellate structure of the 
bankruptcy system is also a significant contributor to the lack of uniformity in bank-
ruptcy law.  Questions of ambiguity in the Bankruptcy Code are resolved first by 
bankruptcy judges.  Bankruptcy judges’ decisions do not create binding precedent, 
however, and thus fail to provide clarity or uniformity surrounding the meaning of 
ambiguous questions of law.349  Likewise, any decisions on questions of law issued 
by the district courts will generally be viewed as lacking precedential effect,350 and 
there is dispute about the precedential nature of BAP decisions as well.351 
Given the general lack of precedential effect of bankruptcy court, BAP, and 
district court decisions on bankruptcy matters, a decision with strong precedential 
effect cannot be handed down until a case reaches the court of appeals or the Supreme 
Court.  Yet relatively few bankruptcy appeals make their way up to the circuit courts, 
and even fewer are heard before the Court.  For example, during the 2010 fiscal 
year, 3,022 bankruptcy appeals were filed in the first-tier appellate courts (the district 
courts and BAPs),352 whereas only 678 bankruptcy appeals were filed in the second-
tier appellate courts (the circuit courts).353  And, during the 2009 October Term, the 
Supreme Court handed down just four bankruptcy decisions,354 a figure that is con-
sistent with the Court’s past practice.355  As these statistics demonstrate, the bulk of 
  
347. See supra note 298 and accompanying text. 
348. For other examples, see Daniel A. Austin, Bankruptcy and the Myth of “Uniform Laws,” 42 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1081 (2012). 
349. See supra note 266 and accompanying text. 
350. See Nash & Pardo, supra note 41, at 1762 & n.71. 
351. See McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 122, at 652–53; Nash & Pardo, supra note 41, at 1761 & n.70, 
1762 & n.73. 
352. See DUFF, supra note 103, app. at 203 tbl.C-11 (indicating that 2177 bankruptcy appeals were filed 
nationally in all U.S. District Courts); id. app. at 133 tbl.B-10 (indicating that 845 bankruptcy appeals 
were filed nationally in all BAPs). 
353. See id. app. at 119 tbl.B-6. 
354. The four decisions were Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010); Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 
2464 (2010); United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367 (2010); and Milavetz, Gallop 
& Milavetz v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010). 
355. One empirical study analyzed certiorari petitions on the Court’s paid docket that involved issues of 
federal bankruptcy law under the Code and that were filed at any point from the Court’s 1978 
October Term through its 1995 October Term.  Robert M. Lawless & Dylan Lager Murray, An 
Empirical Analysis of Bankruptcy Certiorari, 62 MO. L. REV. 101, 113–14, 116–17, 116 n.57 (1997).  
The researchers found that “the Supreme Court receives approximately 50 to 60 bankruptcy certiorari 
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appellate-level policymaking occurs at the first-tier appellate level.  Given that such 
lower-level judicial policymaking generally fails to create binding precedent,356 the 
current structure of bankruptcy administration is poorly designed to achieve uniform, 
clear answers. 
Uniformity seems even less achievable under the current system when one 
contrasts the court-centered model of bankruptcy administration with agency-
administered statutes.357  In the traditional agency realm, just as in the court-
centered bankruptcy realm, the Supreme Court cannot be relied on to impose 
uniformity routinely in statutory construction given the small number of cases the 
Court hears each year.  Yet in the traditional agency realm, where regulatory agencies 
can adopt binding interpretations of ambiguous statutes through notice-and-
comment rulemaking or formal adjudication, Chevron deference operates as a device 
for achieving uniformity because “the national agencies responsible for that admin-
istration can be expected to reach single readings of the statutes for which they are 
responsible and to enforce those readings within their own framework.”358 
4. Accessibility and Transparency 
A fourth major argument often made in favor of delegations of policymaking 
power to agencies is that agencies—at least when they set policy via rulemaking, 
rather than adjudication—“offer the most ‘accessible,’ ‘meaningful,’ and ‘effective’ 
site for public participation in lawmaking.”359  For example, when agencies prom-
ulgate rules via notice-and-comment rulemaking, they must issue a notice of the 
proposed rules, invite and consider comments from the public, and respond in a rea-
soned way to all significant public comments received.360  Indeed, “[i]nterested 
members of the modern tech-savvy public have to go no further than their com-
puters to easily locate proposed rules and file comments electronically.”361  Members 
  
petitions per year, granting cert in an average of 7.0% of these cases and hearing an average of 3 or 4 
bankruptcy cases per year.”  Id. at 132. 
356. See Nash & Pardo, supra note 41, at 1761–62, 1761 nn.68–73 (discussing precedential effect of bank-
ruptcy appeal decisions by district courts and BAPs). 
357. Cf. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2539–40 (2011) (noting in the context of 
the regulation of greenhouse emissions that the EPA is better suited than federal district courts sitting 
as sole adjudicators to regulate given that federal district courts, among other things, “lack authority to 
render precedential decisions binding other judges, even members of the same court”). 
358. Strauss, supra note 324, at 1121. 
359. Lemos, supra note 8, at 450 (quoting Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David 
Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 781–82 (1999)). 
360. See Watts, supra note 244, at 36–37 (describing how rulemaking proceedings conducted by agencies 
are quite accessible to the public). 
361. Id. at 37. 
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of the public can also play a role in prompting agency action and in pushing agency 
agendas by petitioning agencies to engage in rulemaking.362 
In contrast, bankruptcy courts do not adopt substantive policy through a 
transparent process that invites public deliberation and participation.  Thus, the gen-
eral public does not have the opportunity to play a role in shaping the courts’ agen-
das.363  Unlike policy set through notice-and-comment rulemaking, courts resolve 
gaps in the Bankruptcy Code through case-by-case adjudication based on the issues 
presented in particular cases.  In setting policy via case-by-case adjudication, courts 
hear only from the parties and amici, not from the general public.  The terms of the 
discourse in the court are likely to focus on legal sources and hence are likely to be 
different than the terms of discourse that would be before an agency, which can 
frame its decisions in more policy-driven considerations.  Additionally, as one com-
mentator has noted, “there are substantial and important connections to be ex-
plored regarding the intersection of the bankruptcy system and issues of health care, 
labor, taxation, race, and how self-awareness influences use of credit.”364  Yet “[a]s 
long as clarification of the Code’s standards occurs in the judicial setting, the institu-
tional limits of the judicial process make it unlikely that the bankruptcy system can 
explore or address these connections in a thoughtful way.”365 
Another concern is that the litigants who do raise issues of bankruptcy law on 
appeal through the judicial system likely are not representative.  “Many bankruptcy 
litigants cannot afford an appeal to the court of appeals (even if it were the initial 
forum),”366 and the outcomes on appeal may skew in favor of creditors who might be 
able to fund better attorneys than cash-strapped debtors.367  If bankruptcy policy 
were set by agency rules rather than by the courts in individual cases, then debtors—
who might individually be unable to hire an attorney to bring an appeal in the 
bankruptcy context—would have the opportunity to have their collective voices 
heard via organizations dedicated to protecting debtors’ rights, such as the National 
Consumer Law Center or the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy 
  
362. Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2006) (“Each agency shall give an interested person the right to petition 
for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.”). 
363. Cf. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2539–40 (2011) (noting that the EPA is 
better suited than federal district courts to set policies for greenhouse gases because, among other 
things, courts do not “issue rules under notice-and-comment procedures inviting input by any inter-
ested person”). 
364. R. Wilson Freyermuth, Crystals, Mud, BAPCPA, and the Structure of Bankruptcy Decisionmaking, 71 
MO. L. REV. 1069, 1078 (2006) (footnotes omitted). 
365. Id. 
366. McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 122, at 636. 
367. See Nash & Pardo, supra note 321, at 940–46 (discussing why appellate outcomes of debt-
dischargeability determinations will skew in favor of creditors). 
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Attorneys.  Hence, an open, public, and transparent agency process for setting bank-
ruptcy policy would be preferable to the closed judicial process from a good govern-
ance perspective, bringing more voices to the table, enabling broader issues to be 
considered, and allowing different terms of discourse that are better suited to poli-
cymaking. 
5. Prospective Clarity 
A fifth argument often voiced in favor of delegations of rulemaking power to 
administrative agencies is that rulemaking enables agencies to set policy in a way 
that fosters fairness (because rules are generally announced prospectively rather than 
retroactively) and also helps to achieve efficiency (because agencies can promulgate 
clear, blanket rules rather than repeatedly dealing with issues on a case-by-case ba-
sis).368  In other words, rulemaking by agencies can help to achieve prospective 
clarity that brings fairness benefits to those being regulated and efficiency benefits to 
the agency itself. 
In contrast, in the court-centered bankruptcy context, gaps in the Bankruptcy 
Code are filled in case-by-case adjudication and judicial decisions operate in a ret-
roactive fashion by binding the parties.  Consequently, prospective clarity is not 
achieved.  Viewed through an efficiency lens, this lack of prospective clarity is par-
ticularly concerning given that lawyers must repeatedly litigate—and judges must 
repeatedly decide—even some basic issues of bankruptcy law that remain unre-
solved because of the lack of clear precedent.369 
Moreover, viewed through a fairness lens, there is reason to be concerned about 
bankruptcy laws’ lack of prospective clarity.  Although one might think that indi-
vidual consumers rarely plan to file for bankruptcy and hence are unlikely to act in 
reliance on certain bankruptcy policies prior to seeking such relief, the lack of settled 
precedent in bankruptcy may impede “business planning and other client coun-
seling.”370  Specifically, one commentator has pointed out that the lack of prece-
dent “means that attorneys acting in their planning capacity may have little guidance 
  
368. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules With the Force of Law: The 
Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 546 (2002) (describing how the twin concerns of 
efficiency and fairness helped increase reliance on rulemaking, which was viewed as much more likely 
than adjudication “to result in standards that apply prospectively, providing clear notice of the law’s re-
quirements to all concerned”). 
369. See supra notes 326–329 and accompanying text. 
370. McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 122, at 657. 
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in advising a client on the best way to avoid adverse consequences should bank-
ruptcy ensue.”371 
There may indeed be some situations in which litigants may be surprised in a 
“gotcha” manner by the judiciary’s retroactive interpretation of ambiguity in the 
Bankruptcy Code—ambiguity that could fairly easily be resolved in a prospective 
manner via agency rulemaking.  Take, for example, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Schwab v. Reilly.372  In that case, Reilly, the debtor, filed for Chapter 7 relief after her 
one-person catering business failed.373  Reilly sought to claim her cooking equip-
ment as exempt from liquidation by the trustee and did so by listing her exemption 
claim in the equipment ($10,718) to be the same amount as the value she listed for 
the equipment ($10,718).374  The relevant provision of the Bankruptcy Code pro-
vided that the property she listed was to be treated as “exempt” unless “a party in in-
terest objects.”375  The trustee, Schwab, did not object to the exemption within the 
time period specified by the Bankruptcy Rules.  Instead, he sought an appraisal of 
the equipment, which was determined to have a value of $17,200.376  Following this 
appraisal, Schwab sought to sell the equipment to recoup for the benefit of the 
creditors the value in excess of the debtor’s claimed exemption.377  Reilly opposed 
this motion and indicated to the bankruptcy court that, rather than be forced to give 
up her cooking equipment, she would prefer that her case be dismissed because of 
the sentimental value of the equipment,378 which her “parents purchased for her 
despite their own financial difficulties.”379  The bankruptcy court denied Schwab’s 
motion to auction the equipment, and the district court and the court of appeals both 
affirmed the bankruptcy court.380 
In a 6–3 decision, the Supreme Court held that the trustee was not required to 
object to the debtor’s facially valid exemption claim (that is, an exemption claim that 
did not exceed the permissible amount that could be claimed under the Bankruptcy 
Code) in order to preserve the estate’s right to any excess value above and beyond the 
debtor’s claimed exemption.381  This result clearly upended Reilly’s expectations that 
  
371. Lissa Lamkin Broome, Bankruptcy Appeals: The Wheel Is Come Full Circle, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 541, 
542 (1995). 
372. 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010). 
373. Id. at 2657. 
374. Id. at 2657–58. 
375. 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) (2006). 
376. In re Reilly, 543 F.3d 173, 174 (3d Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom. Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010). 
377. Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2658. 
378. Id. 
379. Id. at 2658 n.3. 
380. Id. at 2659. 
381. Id. at 2669. 
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she had taken the necessary steps to claim an exemption in the entire equipment.  In 
her dissent, Justice Ginsburg noted: “In addition to departing from the prevailing 
understanding and practice, the Court’s decision exposes debtors to protracted uncer-
tainty concerning their right to retain exempt property, thereby impeding the ‘fresh 
start’ exemptions are designed to foster.”382  Thus, the Court’s decision provides an 
example of the kind of unfair surprise that sometimes occurs as a result of the judici-
ary’s interpretation of gaps in the Code—and that could potentially be avoided if 
an agency armed with rulemaking powers sought to fill such gaps prospectively.383 
6. Flexibility 
A sixth argument often raised in favor of congressional delegations of poli-
cymaking authority to agencies relates to agencies’ flexibility.  The argument here 
is that agencies are better able to adapt rules to respond to new information, different 
facts, or changed circumstances than Congress (which is constrained by political 
roadblocks and institutional barriers) or the courts (which are constrained by stare 
decisis).384  Once an agency has set a policy via notice-and-comment rulemaking or 
adjudication, it is free to revisit that policy and to change it down the road so long 
as it follows any required procedures, acknowledges the change, and adequately jus-
tifies its new policy.385  The Supreme Court recognized as much in Chevron: “An 
initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone.  On the contrary, the 
agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations 
and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.”386 
  
382. Id. at 2670 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
383. Arguably, courts (like an agency) could achieve prospective clarity in areas such as this one—namely, 
by amending the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure—since Schwab involved a matter of 
procedure.  Indeed, in light of Schwab, the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules has recom-
mended amending the official form for claiming exempt property in bankruptcy.  See Memorandum 
from the Honorable Eugene R. Wedoff, Chair of the Advisory Comm. on Bankr. Rules, to the 
Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair of the Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of 
the Judicial Conference of the U.S. 15–16 (May 6, 2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/BK05-2011.pdf.  However, the process of amending the 
bankruptcy rules is a time-intensive one, which can span anywhere from thirty months to three years.  
See Alan N. Resnick, The Bankruptcy Rulemaking Process, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 245, 246 (1996).  
Agency rulemaking also can take significant time to complete, but procedural rules adopted by agen-
cies are exempt from notice-and-comment requirements, see 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006), and hence an 
agency likely could act fairly quickly to eliminate ambiguities in its procedural rules. 
384. See Lemos, supra note 8, at 453–54. 
385. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810–11 (2009) (discussing how agencies 
may change policy so long as they acknowledge the change and adequately explain the new policy). 
386. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863–64 (1984). 
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This same flexibility rationale does not tip in favor of Congress’s decision to 
delegate a policymaking role to the courts, rather than an agency, in bankruptcy.  
Once a court has issued a precedential opinion, the judges interpreting the Bankruptcy 
Code are constrained by stare decisis principles, and hence courts do not enjoy the 
same flexibility as an administrative agency to adapt to changing circumstances.387  
Although perhaps some areas of the Code should be static, other areas in bankruptcy 
arguably could benefit from a flexible approach that would allow the views of the 
current administration or changing circumstances to influence bankruptcy policy.388  
Consider, for example, the recent Great Recession, which has brought with it a ris-
ing tide of bankruptcy filings by student-loan borrowers.389  The country’s changing 
economic circumstances—and the fact that those with college degrees and massive 
amounts of educational debt have been hit hard—might well be precisely the kind 
of changed circumstance that, if addressed by a regulatory agency instead of a court, 
could warrant revisiting policies about the dischargeability of student loans in bank-
ruptcy.390 
  
387. Cf. Ronald M. Levin, Hard Look Review, Policy Change, and Fox Television, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
555, 569 (2011) (“Stare decisis in the judicial sphere is closely bound up with the aspiration (or if you 
prefer, the myth) of the rule of law.  Agencies, however, act in a quasi-legislative capacity as acknowl-
edged policymakers, and the issues of legitimacy that arise when they jettison a precedent are simply 
not the same.”). 
388. Cf. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (“[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making respon-
sibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s 
views of wise policy to inform its judgments.”). 
389. See supra note 24. 
390. Cf. Armstrong v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Armstrong), Bankr. No. 10-82092, Adv. No. 10-8118, 
2011 WL 6779326, at *9 n.13 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 2011) (“The dischargeability of student loans 
is primarily a question of policy that is for Congress to determine.  The judicially created Brunner 
test is not a source of Congressional policy.  The vagueness of section 523(a)(8) fosters litigation and 
inconsistency of results.  The student loan market has changed dramatically and section 523(a)(8) is in 
need of updating.”).  Courts have taken different views on the relevance of the Great Recession in de-
termining whether a debtor is entitled to an undue hardship discharge of student-loan debt.  Compare 
Sederlund v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Sederlund), 440 B.R. 168, 174 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 
2010) (“The Debtor also points to the current economic recession to support her argument that her 
loans should be discharged.  However, as the Court pointed out, there is no way of knowing how long 
this, or any, recession will last.”), with Thompson v. Loan to Learn (In re Thompson), Bankr. No. 
11-61284-7, Adv. No. 11-00062, 2012 WL 2064509, at *7 (Bankr. D. Mont. June 7, 2012) (“In 
addition the overwhelming fact of the Great Recession which struck this nation, and the Flathead 
Valley, cannot be ignored when evaluating Leslie’s employment prospects or chances for more lucra-
tive earnings.”). 
Natural disasters are yet another example of changed circumstances that could warrant revisiting 
discharge policies in bankruptcy.  Cf. Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (In re Pigg), 453 B.R. 
728, 733–34 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011) (“Under Congress’ current legislation, victims of natural 
disasters such as Ms. Pigg, would lose their homes and be required to continue to pay HOA fees for 
houses they no longer occupy, have surrendered in bankruptcy, but cannot force lenders to accept by 
deed in lieu of foreclosure or force foreclosure.  Section 523(a)(16) will require the victims of the Joplin, 
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In sum, the considerations that generally tip in favor of delegating policymak-
ing powers to administrative agencies—expertise, accountability, uniformity, acces-
sibility, transparency, prospective clarity, and flexibility—do not similarly tip in 
favor of delegating policymaking in the bankruptcy arena to the courts.  Rather, 
these considerations suggest that an administrative agency, on balance, would be 
better equipped as a matter of institutional design to set bankruptcy policy. 
III. REDESIGNING BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION 
TO BE UNEXCEPTIONAL 
Having demonstrated why an administrative agency endowed with substan-
tive rulemaking powers would be better suited than courts to set bankruptcy policy, 
our focus now shifts to discuss what such an agency might look like.  In thinking 
about this question, we begin in Part III.A with a historical examination of prior 
bankruptcy reform efforts, assessing whether the historical roots of the court-
centered model or various past reform efforts help to illuminate how bankruptcy 
could be redesigned moving forward.  With this history in mind, we turn in Part 
III.B to thinking about how a federal bankruptcy agency might be created and 
charged with setting federal bankruptcy policy.  Rather than trying to set forth one 
definitive vision of how to structure a new bankruptcy agency, Part III.B tentatively 
proposes two different options—one more modest and one more robust. 
A. Lessons From the Past: Institutional Inertia and the Persistence  
of the Court-Centered Model 
The historical record reveals that, from the earliest days of the Republic and 
with every iteration of the bankruptcy laws, Congress tasked the federal courts with 
administration of the bankruptcy system—in all likelihood due to the seemingly 
private nature of individual disputes between debtors and creditors and the manner 
in which such disputes translate into competing claims to payment from a debtor’s 
estate.  As Frank Kennedy has observed, “It seems to have been assumed by Congress 
  
Missouri tornadoes, the late April 2011 tornadoes in the South, the 2011 Mississippi River flood 
victims, the 2010 Nashville Flood victims, and all others who have suffered loss of their home from 
massive disasters to be denied a true fresh start because their lenders cannot be forced to foreclose or 
accept a deed in lieu of foreclosure.  The perfect storm of the ‘Great Recession’ and these unspeakable 
natural disasters leaves debtors such as Ms. Pigg and other victims like her to suffer unbearable losses 
of their homes, all their belongings, and loved ones, and be denied the fresh start promised by bank-
ruptcy.  Ms. Pigg, and other like victims, suffer a wrong without a remedy.” (footnotes omitted)). 
446 60 UCLA L. REV. 384 (2012) 
 
from the beginning that bankruptcy should be administered by courts.”391  Moreover, 
in every instance in which Congress created a bankruptcy regime prior to the 
Bankruptcy Code’s enactment in 1978,392 it “authorize[d] courts of bankruptcy to 
appoint commissioners, assignees, registers, trustees, receivers, and referees to handle 
the actual administration of bankruptcy cases.”393  Thus, the congressional blueprint 
prior to the current bankruptcy system had always been—as it remains today—a 
court-centered model in which non–Article III adjuncts assisted the Article III court 
in administering bankruptcy estates.394 
Importantly, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 marked a significant shift in the 
orientation of the bankruptcy system from a creditor collection device to a forum 
for effectuating substantive relief for debtors.395  Moreover, the 1898 Act marked 
the start of what would become an increasingly powerful role for the non–Article III 
adjunct in bankruptcy matters.396  With these changes, there ostensibly existed an 
opportunity for Congress to reconceptualize bankruptcy administration—specifically, 
by charging an administrative agency with responsibility for the system.  Perhaps 
because of path dependencies, however, Congress chose to follow the court-
centered tradition.  With this institutional inertia, the bankruptcy system continued 
its inexorable march down the path of judicial administration, even as the modern 
administrative state emerged and other areas of law turned toward agency admin-
istration.397 
What is perhaps most interesting about this focus on court-centered admin-
istration is that, during the time period spanning enactment of the 1898 Act and 
passage of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, reformers were dissatisfied with the 
  
391. Kennedy, supra note 195, at 3. 
392. Those regimes were the Bankruptcy Acts of 1800, 1841, 1867, and 1898.  Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 
2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803); Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843); Act of Mar. 2, 
1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878); Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). 
393. Richard B. Levin, Towards a Model of Bankruptcy Administration, 44 S.C. L. REV. 963, 965–66 (1993) 
(footnotes omitted). 
394. Id.  For a detailed account of the role of Article III courts and non–Article III adjuncts under each of 
these Acts, see Kennedy, supra note 195, at 5–9. 
395. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
325, 364–65 (1991). 
396. See, e.g., ADMINISTRATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT: REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION 4–6 (1941); SKEEL, supra 
note 279, at 144. 
397. See Baird, supra note 198, at 12 (“At the same time that modern bankruptcy came into being with its 
system of referees appointed by district courts, Congress created administrative agencies like the 
Interstate Commerce Commission.”); see also id. at 15 (“One can easily imagine that bankruptcy law 
would have a different shape if Congress had waited to put it into place . . . . Congress might have 
created an agency charged with administering the bankruptcy laws.”). 
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adjuncts’ manner of managing bankruptcy cases and repeatedly sought to create an 
agency within the bankruptcy system.398  The reformers were not concerned with 
whether to locate bankruptcy policymaking in the courts or in an agency; rather, 
their proposals—which ultimately were quelled by bankruptcy professionals whose 
economic self-interest motivated them to stave off institutional redesign399—were 
motivated largely by a perceived need for independent oversight that would safeguard 
against abuses in the managerial and ministerial administration of bankruptcy 
cases.400  In other words, structural reform efforts between 1898 and 1978 focused 
primarily on the management401 and busywork in the supervision and processing 
of bankruptcy cases and on concerns about judicial participation in non-judicial 
administrative tasks.402 
Several reports published between 1931 and 1978 embody that focus.  The 
1931 Donovan Report proposed the creation of a federal bankruptcy commissioner’s 
office in the executive branch to help separate the judicial functions from the ad-
ministrative functions in bankruptcy proceedings.403  The proposal envisioned a 
commissioner who would help coordinate and effectively supervise bankruptcy 
administration, investigate and correct abuses, and study major problems in bank-
  
398. See, e.g., SKEEL, supra note 279, at 77 (“[T]he findings of the Donovan investigation were dramatic and 
shocking and suggested a wide-ranging conspiracy to control bankruptcy administration . . . . [T]he 
Thacher report reached essentially the same conclusions.”). 
399. See, e.g., id. at 93 (“If Congress appointed administrative overseers to investigate debtors and make 
formal recommendations as to whether each debtor should get a discharge, bankruptcy lawyers and 
judges would figure much less prominently in bankruptcy practice.”); Eric A. Posner, The Political 
Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH. L. REV. 47, 80 (1997) (“Evidence of the 
bankruptcy judges’ practice of appointing cronies to the position of trustee supports the hypothesis that 
the bankruptcy judges opposed the bankruptcy agency because they feared losing their patronage 
power.”). 
400. See STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 282, at 197 (noting that, in its summary of deficiencies regarding 
the bankruptcy system, one proposal for reform listed “[m]anagement by a coalition of referees, 
trustees, and the bankruptcy bar which is of little benefit to debtors, creditors, or the public” and 
“[m]anagement characterized by loose supervision, infrequent field examinations, little concern for 
qualifications of personnel, archaic procedures, high costs, and unwarranted delays”). 
401. See, e.g., id. at 200 (noting that “problems of guidance and management” in bankruptcy cases might 
not need to be retained in the courts); Honorable Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the United States, 
Address at the Annual Dinner of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Conference of the National Association of 
Referees in Bankruptcy (Oct. 23, 1962), in 37 J. NAT’L ASS’N REF. BANKR. 3, 4 (1963) (discussing 
the high costs of bankruptcy administration, such as the salaries and expenses of the referees and 
trustees). 
402. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 4 (1977) (“The bill removes many of the supervisory functions from the 
judge in the first instance, transfers most of them to the trustee and to the United States trustee, and 
involves the judge only when a dispute arises.”), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5966. 
403. See H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 71ST CONG., ADMINISTRATION OF BANKRUPTCY ESTATES 
26–33 (Comm. Print 1931) (Colonel William Donovan). 
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ruptcy administration.404  The Thacher Report, published in 1932, similarly pro-
posed the creation of ten full-time, salaried administrators under the Attorney 
General who would study problems of bankruptcy administration, report on the 
qualifications of applicants for trusteeships, and monitor the work of trustees.405  
The Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Bankruptcy Administration, 
which was published in 1941 during the formative era of the modern administra-
tive state, likewise focused on relieving the judiciary of non-judicial tasks.406 
Decades later, two other notable reform proposals—the Brookings Report of 
1971 and the Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of 1973 (the 
Commission Report)—similarly focused on the system’s inefficiencies and the prob-
lem of having “a judicial system to try to solve problems that are by nature adminitra-
tive.”407  Yet both the Brookings and Commission Reports proposed an even more 
radical restructuring of the bankruptcy system than their predecessors, suggesting 
that bankruptcy move from its judicial model to an administrative model. 
Specifically, the Brookings Report suggested eliminating the courts from the 
bankruptcy system by creating an agency that would process both uncontested and 
contested matters, with examiners adjudicating contested matters in compliance 
with the Administrative Procedure Act;408 and, “[i]n the event that contested issues 
were not satisfactorily resolved by examiners, appeals would go first to a central ap-
peals board in the agency and then, if necessary, to the courts of appeals.”409   
In contrast to the Brookings Report’s proposal to eliminate the courts alto-
gether, the Commission Report proposed divorcing the courts from managerial 
and ministerial administration by shifting non-judicial administrative tasks to a 
newly created United States Bankruptcy Administration.410  The new agency would 
have been empowered to, among other things, handle voluntary petitions and grant 
discharges when no objections were filed;411 the bankruptcy courts would receive 
  
404. See id. 
405. See STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM, S. DOC. NO. 72-65, at 93–94 
(1932) (Solicitor General Thomas Thacher). 
406. See ADMINISTRATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT, supra note 396, at 122, 127–32 (suggesting 
the creation of a Division of Bankruptcy in the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, which would 
examine and audit referees, collect bankruptcy statistics, make recommendations to Congress, and 
investigate complaints regarding bankruptcy officials). 
407. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, 
H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 117 (1973) (quoting the Brookings Report). 
408. STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 282, at 215. 
409. Id. 
410. See H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 103.   
411. Id. at 51–65, 121–25. 
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matters where disputes arose.412  The Commission Report’s recommendations also 
differed from the Brookings Report’s recommendations in that the Commission 
Report expressly contemplated giving the new agency’s administrator the power 
“to adopt, amend, and repeal such rules and regulations not in conflict with the 
provisions of this Act as he finds necessary to discharge his authority, duties, and 
functions.”413  Given that the Commission Report focused primarily on divorcing 
the courts from managerial and ministerial administration, however, it is unclear 
whether or not the Commission Report contemplated that this rulemaking grant 
would vest the proposed new agency with broad substantive rulemaking powers.414  
Regardless, had the Commission Report’s proposal not “died an early death” because 
of vigorous opposition by judges and lawyers,415 it would have come the closest of 
any proposal toward creating an agency vested with the power to set uniform bank-
ruptcy policy via regulation. 
Much like bankruptcy reformers, bankruptcy scholars who have considered 
the optimal design of bankruptcy administration have focused on the extent of court 
involvement in non-judicial, administrative tasks.  Also like the bankruptcy re-
formers of the past, these scholars have generally failed to appreciate the distinct 
policymaking aspect of bankruptcy administration and hence have not considered 
whether an agency might be well-suited for setting bankruptcy policy.416  For exam-
  
412. See, e.g., id. at 121 (“Any involuntary petition will be referred immediately to the bankruptcy court 
for the territory in which the administrator’s office is located.”); id. at 122 (“When the administrator 
disallows a claim or allows a claim over an objection made thereto, he is required to notify the claimant 
and the objector, who may take the matter to the bankruptcy court by complaint.”). 
413. H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 2., at 55. 
414. On the one hand, the Commission Report did speak of the need for a national organization capable of 
developing “procedures, practices, and guidelines appropriate for national uniform application.”  H.R. 
DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 126.  Yet on the other hand, the Report seemed to suggest that the 
rulemaking grant would simply transfer to the new agency those rulemaking powers that were at 
the time already vested in the Judicial Conference and the Supreme Court.  See id.  In addition, the 
proposed rulemaking grant would have merely given the agency’s administrator the power to make 
rules and regulations “necessary to discharge his authority, duties and functions.”  H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, 
pt. 2, at 55 (emphasis added).  In contrast to a grant that could have broadly given the administrator 
the power to promulgate any such rules as may have been necessary to administer the Commission’s 
model act, this proposed language may have been purposefully narrow.  See Merrill & Watts, supra 
note 368, at 482–83 (noting that different verbal formulations in rulemaking grants could be meant to 
convey broader or narrower rulemaking powers, but noting that the courts have rarely “suggested that 
different verbal formulations signify the conveyance of different types of powers”). 
415. SKEEL, supra note 279, at 143–46; Posner, supra note 399, at 80, 84. 
416. Jonathan Lipson is one scholar who has failed to appreciate the distinction between bankruptcy 
administration involving policymaking and mere ministerial administration.  See Lipson, supra note 
3, at 654–57.  Specifically, after noting that bankruptcy is “a matter of adjudication rather than agency 
administration,” id. at 654, Lipson observes that “much of the work of bankruptcy courts is adminis-
trative, or at least so different in kind from the work of Article III district court judges as to be 
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ple, Richard Levin has argued that “authoritative decisions about disputed forensic 
matters in bankruptcy cases should be made in the judicial system.”417  On the other 
hand, he notes that “[t]he allocation of nonforensic decision-making responsibility 
involves selecting an officer or institution to perform that managerial job,”418 and he 
proposes that a governmental supervisory official do so.419  In a more particularized 
context, Angela Littwin has explored the implications of proposals to convert 
Chapter 7 consumer bankruptcy into an administrative program.420  She focuses on 
the actual processing of bankruptcy cases, arguing that the court-centered model 
offers more manageable procedural hurdles, more widespread legal representation, 
and higher-quality decisionmakers than do administrative programs involving wel-
fare, social security disability, and veterans’ benefits.421 
To date, the one scholar to express concern over the judicial model has been R. 
Wilson Freyermuth.  In briefly discussing the Brookings Report’s proposal to create 
a bankruptcy agency,422 he notes: 
While the Brookings Report envisioned a bankruptcy agency that would 
have been primarily operational and not regulatory in nature, an adminis-
trative model could have created a system in which disputes over inter-
pretational questions were resolved in a much more streamlined manner.  
  
unrecognizable as adjudication.”  Id. at 654–55.  Yet in listing examples of what he views as the admin-
istrative work conducted by bankruptcy courts, Lipson notes that “bankruptcy judges . . . manage 
the filing, and allowance or disallowance, of claims.”  Id. at 655.  Hence, Lipson fails to distinguish 
between (1) administrative tasks and (2) the policymaking that can result from administration of a 
statutory scheme.  Lipson is correct that the claim-filing process entails ministerial administration 
(although the bankruptcy court clerk, see 28 U.S.C. § 156(b) (2006), rather than the bankruptcy 
judge, manages such filings).  See FED. R. BANKR. P. 5005(a)(1).  On the other hand, the claim-
allowance process is one that potentially presents an opportunity for judicial policymaking.  The Code 
provides that a filed claim “is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest . . . objects.”  11 U.S.C. 
§ 502(a) (2006); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 3007(a).  If such an objection is made, the court is to 
determine the validity and amount of the claim, see 11 U.S.C. § 502(b), with the possibility that the 
claim will be disallowed to the extent required by certain statutory limitations, see id. § 502(b)(1)–(9).  
Residual policymaking inheres in such a determination.  See, e.g., Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. 
v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 449 (2006) (“This case requires us to consider whether the 
Bankruptcy Code disallows contract-based claims for attorney’s fees based solely on the fact that 
the fees at issue were incurred litigating issues of bankruptcy law.  We conclude that it does not.”).  
Hence, it is descriptively incorrect to categorize the claim-allowance process, with its potential to give 
rise to a contested matter, as an administrative task. 
417. Levin, supra note 393, at 978. 
418. Id. 
419. Id. at 983.  Notably, Levin would not fit decisionmaking by this official within an agency adjudicatory 
structure.  See id. at 990. 
420. See Angela Littwin, The Affordability Paradox: How Consumer Bankruptcy’s Greatest Weakness May 
Account for Its Surprising Success, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933, 1980–2022 (2011). 
421. Id. 
422. See supra note 408 and accompanying text. 
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For example, Congress might have created broad statutory standards 
regarding certain policy issues—e.g., the “substantial abuse” screen for 
Chapter 7 relief, as in the old § 707(b)—and an administrative mecha-
nism for implementing those standards through rulemaking.  This model 
might have provided for more consistent application of the Code’s 
standards to similarly-situated debtors throughout the system, particu-
larly by comparison to an adversarial model that produces clarity—when 
it produces clarity—only through percolation.  Further, such a system 
would have permitted more frequent and effective refinement of the 
applicable regulations over time, as warranted by empirical evaluation of 
the system’s operation and its external effects on the behavior of com-
mercial actors.  Last, but not least, judicial review in such a model would 
presumably come with appropriate deference for the administrator’s in-
terpretation of the statute, a concept that implicitly discourages disap-
pointed litigants from aggressively seeking judicial review of merely 
debatable questions of statutory interpretation.423 
Freyermuth’s commentary highlights the fact that Congress’s decision to lo-
cate regulation of a statutory scheme in the judiciary, rather than in an agency, raises 
consequentialist concerns given the institutional differences between the two models.  
In making these cursory observations, however, Freyermuth does not attempt to 
make the case for relocating administration of the Bankruptcy Code in an agency.  
Rather, his main point seems to be that, despite other potential options, we now 
“have the system we have” for better or for worse.424 
In sum, both bankruptcy reformers and scholars have fixated on how to sepa-
rate judicial tasks from managerial or mere ministerial tasks in bankruptcy, and both 
have repeatedly failed to focus on whether the courts or an administrative agency 
would be better equipped to set bankruptcy policy.  Nonetheless, the Brookings and 
Commission Reports do provide useful blueprints for a shift toward an agency 
model.  Hence, even if the reports do not focus directly on the setting of bankruptcy 
policy via rulemaking, they are helpful in thinking about the ideal structure of such 
an agency.   
  
423. Freyermuth, supra note 364, at 1077–78 (footnotes omitted). 
424. Id. at 1078. 
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B. Toward the Future: Sketching Out the Contours of a Federal  
Bankruptcy Agency 
Federal agencies come in many different shapes and sizes,425 and a new federal 
bankruptcy agency designed to engage in bankruptcy policymaking could take many 
different forms.  Accordingly, rather than trying to set forth one definitive vision, we 
instead sketch out two permutations (one minimalist, one robust) and encourage a 
conversation among scholars and reformers about what an ideal federal bankruptcy 
agency might look like. 
1. A Minimalist Model 
Perhaps the most minimalist way of enabling an agency to engage in setting 
substantive bankruptcy policy would be to give the EOUST broad rulemaking pow-
ers while simultaneously leaving intact the current court system for handling bank-
ruptcy matters.  This approach would also involve eliminating the BA Program 
currently operating in North Carolina and Alabama, thereby wiping away constitu-
tional issues that surround the BAs426 and the odd geographical divide that currently 
exists between bankruptcy administration in those two states and in the rest of the 
country.427  Because this approach, at bottom, would vest the EOUST with broad 
rulemaking powers but leave adjudicatory powers with the courts, this approach ef-
fectively hybridizes bankruptcy administration between two entities: the EOUST 
and the courts.428 
There are several reasons why a hybrid model along these lines might be desir-
able.  First, a few scholars have recently suggested that courts may produce better 
adjudicatory decisions than agencies.  For example, Littwin has concluded that 
bankruptcy’s court-centered model offers more manageable procedural hurdles, 
more widespread legal representation, and higher-quality decisionmakers than do 
administrative programs involving welfare, social security disability, and veterans’ 
  
425. See PIERCE, supra note 243, at 1–2. 
426. See supra Part II.A.2. 
427. See supra notes 68–83 and accompanying text; see also GEN. GOV’T DIV., supra note 66, at 2–3 (recom-
mending the elimination of the BA Program because of “advantages in oversight and funding provid-
ed by the UST program and to make bankruptcy administration consistent across the country”). 
428. Cf. Lemos, supra note 9, at 381 n.74 (“[T]he choice between delegations to courts and delegations to 
agencies [need not] be all-or-nothing; Congress can and sometimes does divide power between courts 
and agencies, for example by giving an agency primary interpretive authority but providing for en-
forcement through the courts.”). 
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benefits.429  In addition, James Wright and Angela Diveley’s preliminary findings 
from their recent study of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) suggest that the 
FTC does not perform as well as generalist judges in its adjudicatory function.430  
Much more study is needed on the relative merits of court-centered versus agency-
centered adjudication.431  If courts are more efficient and effective than agencies at 
adjudicating disputes, however, then a distinct advantage of hybridizing bankrupt-
cy administration would be that the courts could continue to adjudicate bankruptcy 
matters,432 while the EOUST could set bankruptcy policy via regulation. 
Second, a hybrid approach would clearly separate the rulemaking function, 
which often involves policy decisions and political oversight, from the adjudicatory 
  
429. See Littwin, supra note 420, at 1988–2022.  However, many of the arguments offered by Littwin in 
support of her conclusions are open to question.  For example, with regard to procedural hurdles, 
Littwin touts the court-centered model for its ability to process Chapter 7 cases quickly (that is, from 
filing to discharge), partially attributing this phenomenon to attorney incentives.  See id. at 1993 & 
n.311.  She concludes that the experience of other administrative programs suggests that the shift to 
an agency-centered model would not likely result in any reduction of case-processing times.  See id. at 
1993–94.  Missing from Littwin’s argument is any acknowledgement that it is the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure that facilitate the quick processing of Chapter 7 discharges.  See Pardo, supra 
note 124, at 8, 9 & nn.12–14.  Similar (if not faster) claim-processing rules could be implemented in 
an agency-centered model. 
Littwin also praises the court-centered model for “respect[ing] its beneficiaries’ time,” specifically 
noting that bankruptcy courts generally do not require debtors to appear in court to receive their dis-
charges.  Littwin, supra note 420, at 1994.  She then observes that “[t]his process stands in stark con-
trast to the welfare approach, in which missing one of the many required face-to-face meetings is a 
significant factor in the denial and termination of benefits.”  Id.  Missing from Littwin’s argument is 
any acknowledgment that a debtor must attend the meeting of creditors, see 11 U.S.C. § 343 (2006) 
(“The debtor shall appear and submit to examination under oath at the meeting of creditors under 
section 341(a) of this title.”), and that failure to attend the meeting is one of the primary grounds for 
dismissal of a debtor’s case, see Pardo, supra note 124, at 27 tbl.4 (reporting that, among the consumer 
Chapter 7 cases that were dismissed in the Western District of Washington between 2003 and 2007, 
31.6 percent of such cases were dismissed on the grounds that the debtor failed to attend the meeting 
of creditors).  This is quite significant given that “dismissal of a debtor’s case will dispositively result in 
the failure of the debtor to obtain a discharge and thus bankruptcy’s fresh start.”  Id. at 19.  These are 
just a few of the many instances in which Littwin overstates the advantages of the court-centered 
model over the agency-centered model. 
430. James M. Wright & Angela M. Diveley, Do Expert Agencies Outperform Generalist Judges? Some 
Preliminary Evidence From the Federal Trade Commission (Jan. 23, 2012) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1990034. 
431. More study is needed in part because scholars have reached different conclusions.  Compare id. (find-
ing that generalist judges perform adjudicatory functions better than the FTC), with Michael R. Baye 
& Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judges? The Impact of Economic 
Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals, 54 J.L. & ECON. 1 (2011) (concluding that antitrust cases 
are too complex for judges). 
432. The expeditious and efficient administration of bankruptcy estates is certainly a concern underlying 
the Bankruptcy Code.  See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE 
UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 75, 81–82 (1973). 
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function, which demands independence and insulation to ensure fair decisions.  
Hence, the split model would respond to “criticisms of the impartiality of adjudi-
cations by agencies that combine rulemaking, adjudicatory, and enforcement func-
tions,”433 and it might instill more confidence in the fairness of the adjudicatory 
process than a traditional administrative model would.434 
Third, the EOUST could still help achieve uniform interpretations of the 
Bankruptcy Code while the courts carry out adjudicatory functions.  If Congress 
clearly specified that the EOUST were to have primary interpretative authority, the 
EOUST would be eligible for deference from the courts for its interpretations of 
ambiguous Code provisions.435  Furthermore, if an unresolved issue of statutory am-
biguity arose in the courts before the EOUST had a chance to resolve that particular 
policy question, the EOUST—under established administrative law precedent—
could nonetheless adopt a contrary construction of the statutory ambiguity at a later 
point.436 
Despite these advantages, the minimalist model has potential downsides.  Al-
though this approach would eliminate the BA Program, it would leave the bank-
ruptcy courts intact.  Hence, it would do nothing to address the Article III issues 
currently implicating the bankruptcy courts after Stern.437  Furthermore, because 
the EOUST already has an established institutional structure, the ability to design 
the structure of an entirely new bankruptcy agency with an eye toward reducing the 
likelihood of agency capture would be forfeited.438 
In addition, hybrid models of agency administration have faced criticism in re-
cent years.439  For example, critics have noted that administrative law generally gives 
agencies wide discretion to choose whether to proceed via adjudication or rulemak-
  
433. Revesz, supra note 259, at 1115. 
434. See George Robert Johnson, Jr., The Split-Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions From the OSHA and 
MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 315, 344–45 (1987) (suggesting that whether or not split 
models do achieve better results, there may be a perception that separating the adjudicatory and 
rulemaking functions better protects due process notions and instills confidence in the system). 
435. For a discussion of deference standards, see supra notes 284–287 and accompanying text. 
436. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83 (2005) (“Only 
a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the agency’s interpretation, and 
therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency construction.”). 
437. See supra Part II.A.1.  But see Deitz v. Ford (In re Deitz), 469 B.R. 11, 23 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e 
conclude that the holding in Stern is not clearly irreconcilable with the existing precedent . . . that a 
bankruptcy court may liquidate a debt and enter a final judgment in conjunction with finding the debt 
nondischargeable.”). 
438. See infra notes 450–457 (discussing how an agency’s institutional design can help to minimize agency 
capture). 
439. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives and 
Legislative Reform, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 62 (1989). 
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ing440 and that split-function models offend this notion “by eliminating agency 
discretion to choose between policy development through rulemaking and adjudi-
cation.”441  Some have also criticized the competence of an adjudicatory arm to re-
view a regulatory arm’s legal and policy decisions, asserting that the split model can 
allow “independent review of legal and policy questions by an Agency not compe-
tent” to address those sorts of policy questions.442 
Despite these potential downsides, a minimalist model that would simply seek 
to vest the EOUST with substantive rulemaking powers has real appeal as a means 
of bringing greater expertise, accountability, uniformity, accessibility, transparency, 
prospective clarity, and flexibility to bankruptcy policymaking.  Perhaps most allur-
ing is the fact that, rather than trying to muster the political support for the creation 
of a new agency, this model would draw on a preexisting agency and leave the current 
court structure intact, thereby increasing the political viability of the model.443  
Hence, we believe that the minimalist model deserves serious consideration. 
2. A Robust Model 
A much more robust—and more radical—approach would be to eliminate the 
current bankruptcy court system and the BA and UST Programs entirely, thereby 
enabling the creation of a brand new federal bankruptcy agency charged with both 
adjudicatory and rulemaking functions.  In other words, bankruptcy administration 
would move from the courts to a traditional regulatory model. 
In terms of how this might be done, the Brookings Report from 1971 provides 
perhaps the most useful roadmap.  The Brookings Report describes in detail how an 
  
440. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202–03 (1947) (holding that it is primarily in the discretion 
of agencies to decide whether to proceed via rulemaking or adjudication). 
441. Koch, supra note 10, at 114. 
442. Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 439, at 62. 
443. The serious political battles that can erupt over the creation of new agencies is nicely illustrated by the 
new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).  After Congress created the agency in 2010, 
President Obama was unable to get the Senate to consider his nomination to head the CFPB due to 
Republican Senators’ displeasure with the structure and powers of the agency.  See Binyamin 
Appelbaum, Former Ohio Attorney General to Head New Consumer Agency, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2011, 
at B1.  Specifically, the Republican Senators argued that the single-headed CFPB was too politically 
insulated; they wanted the agency to be multi-membered rather than single-headed; and they wanted 
Congress to exercise more control over the agency’s budget.  See id.  After President Obama’s nomi-
nation to head the CFPB stalled out in the Senate because of the Republicans’ concerns about the 
agency’s structure, President Obama—in a highly controversial move—ultimately resorted to a recess 
appointment.  See Helene Cooper & Jennifer Steinhauer, Bucking Senate: Obama Appoints Consumer 
Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2012, at A1. 
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agency could be created to take over the work done by courts, trustees, and others:444 
A single director would head the agency, but the agency would be “highly decentral-
ized, with all possible decisions made at or near the place where the bankruptcy pe-
tition is filed.”445  Given the administrative, non-judicial nature of uncontested 
matters, agency personnel would handle them efficiently.446  In contrast, contest-
ed matters would be heard and adjudicated in compliance with the Administrative 
Procedure Act,447 with administrative law judges making initial determinations and 
a central agency appeals board and the circuit courts determining appeals.448 
Because the Brookings Report envisioned an “operating agency, not a regula-
tory agency,”449 its recommendations do not speak to giving the agency substantive 
rulemaking powers.  Nonetheless, such powers could be engrafted into the adjudica-
tory powers that the Brookings Report envisioned, thereby creating a robust regu-
latory agency with both adjudicatory and rulemaking powers in the mold of many 
traditional administrative agencies, such as the SEC.  
Such a bold move—which would necessitate the creation of a new agency and 
rewriting major portions of the Bankruptcy Code—would obviously face significant 
political hurdles.  Bankruptcy judges, private trustees, and others whose economic 
interests align them with the current court-centered system of bankruptcy admin-
istration would likely object.  In addition, the new agency’s institutional design 
would remain a question.  For example, should it be structured as an independ-
ent agency insulated from presidential removal powers (as many financial regulato-
ry agencies are),450 or as an executive agency subject to direct presidential control?  
Should it be single-headed or multi-membered?451  Should appeals from the agency 
be subject to review in any of the courts of appeals or in a single Article III forum to 
  
444. STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 282, at 199. 
445. Id. at 201. 
446. Id. at 200. 
447. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596 (2006). 
448. STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 282, at 215. 
449. Id. at 201. 
450. See Bressman & Thompson, supra note 310, at 607 (“Financial agencies, which exercise expansive in-
fluence over the nation’s financial affairs, are among the most prominent independent agencies.”). 
451. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. 
REV. 15, 37 (2010) (“It is often remarked that independent agencies are characterized not only by 
their statutory for-cause removal protections but also by the fact that they are typically multimember 
bodies.”); Bressman & Thompson, supra note 310, at 610 (noting that independent agencies “are gen-
erally run by multi-member commissions or boards, whose members serve fixed, staggered terms, 
rather than a cabinet secretary or single administrator who serves at the pleasure of the President and 
thus will likely depart with a change of administration, if not before”). 
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try to maximize uniformity?452  Should the agency be subject to normal congression-
al appropriations processes, or should the agency be self-funded through, for exam-
ple, bankruptcy filing fees?453  Should there be restrictions on the agency’s personnel 
in terms of initial hiring requirements designed to reduce partisan decisionmaking?454 
Careful consideration of these and other questions would be crucial because 
the institutional design of agencies can be “critically important for insulation against 
one-sided interest group dominance,” known as agency capture.455  Of particular 
concern would be the influence of lawyers, who historically have been the most 
dominant interest group to affect the shape of our bankruptcy system.456  In addi-
tion, it should be noted that capture is not a problem unique to agencies.  To the con-
trary, Lynn LoPucki has noted that bankruptcy courts are susceptible to capture—
including capture by lawyers.457  Thus, it is not clear that relocating bankruptcy 
  
452. See McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 122, at 683–84 (exploring the possibility of creating a Federal 
Court of Bankruptcy Appeals staffed by Article III judges to engage in centralized review and to help 
bring uniformity to bankruptcy).  See generally Revesz, supra note 259, at 1153 (discussing the issue of 
review by generalist Article III courts versus specialized reviewing courts and ultimately concluding 
that “specialized judges are likely to exhibit structural biases, and therefore that they are likely to de-
crease the effectiveness of congressional delegation to administrative agencies”). 
453. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, 
H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 119 (1973) (recommending that the proposed bankruptcy agency be 
funded through fees and charges as well as any funds Congress chooses to appropriate because “[e]ffec-
tive Congressional oversight is best assured by control over the financing of the Administration”); cf. 
Barkow, supra note 451, at 43–44 (noting that the structure of an agency’s funding can be critical in 
terms of protecting against capture and discussing the relevance of an agency’s funding source). 
454. See Barkow, supra note 451, at 48 (“Requiring appointees to possess certain qualifications can help 
limit partisan decision making, and it also facilitates expert decision making because individuals are 
hired not with an eye toward having them become experts on the job but with the idea that they will 
join the agency with the relevant skill set.”). 
455. Id. at 15. 
456. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Lawyers and the Shape of American Bankruptcy Law, 67 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 497, 498 (1998) (“The bankruptcy bar not only helped to assure the permanence of American 
bankruptcy law; the bar also has had an enormous influence on the [1898] Act’s subsequent develop-
ment.  Other interest groups, from lenders and other creditors to debtors and potential debtors, have 
always had a big stake, too.  Collective action problems and related considerations, however, have lim-
ited the influence of unsecured creditors and debtors.  Although banks and other lenders are not si-
milarly constrained, their priority status and ability to adjust their interest rates in response to 
debtor-friendly bankruptcy laws limit the range of issues they are concerned with.  As a result, no other 
group has had nearly so pervasive an impact on bankruptcy law as the bankruptcy bar.  Bankruptcy 
lawyers’ influence on the evolution of bankruptcy law is, in a sense, the rest of the story of bankrupt-
cy in the United States.”).  For a recent example of lobbying by bankruptcy lawyers, see Editorial, The 
Trouble With Bankruptcy Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2012, at SR10 (“[A]t a contentious meeting 
at the Justice Department last week, law firms with big bankruptcy practices made clear that they were 
not about to accept [new Chapter 11 fee] guidelines willingly.”). 
457. See, e.g., LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS 
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 243 (2005) (“The courts’ incentives were to serve man-
agers and those managers’ lawyers and contract allies.  When any of those interests come into conflict 
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administration to an agency-centered model would exacerbate the capture prob-
lems that already inhere in the court-centered model, especially if careful attention 
is given to questions of institutional design that can help to minimize the new 
bankruptcy agency’s risk of capture. 
In light of the many unanswered questions of institutional design, any attempt 
to create a robust bankruptcy agency vested with both rulemaking and adjudicatory 
powers would likely engender heated political debates about the virtues and vices of 
different agency structures.  Indeed, recent controversies that have engulfed the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), an agency created in 2010 with 
the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, have focused heavily on Republicans’ unhappi-
ness with the CFPB’s structural aspects, such as the Director’s tenure protections.458 
Nonetheless, despite these very real political hurdles, the robust approach de-
scribed here merits careful consideration and discussion for several reasons.  First, a 
robust model would align bankruptcy administration within the traditional agency 
model, thereby furthering notions of expertise, accountability, uniformity, acces-
sibility, transparency, prospective clarity, and flexibility in the setting of bankruptcy 
policy.  Second, it would avoid concerns that have plagued other split-function 
agencies,459 and it would leave the agency with the option of setting policy via case-
by-case adjudication rather than rulemaking where appropriate.460 
Furthermore, the creation of a robust bankruptcy agency armed with both ad-
judicatory and rulemaking powers might well resolve some of the Stern-like Article 
III issues that have cast a shadow over the bankruptcy courts.461  In the traditional 
administrative law context, in cases like Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. 
Schor,462 the Court has been quite liberal in allowing agency adjudicators to adjudi-
cate even traditional state law claims when Congress intended to create inexpensive 
and expeditious specialized administrative forums to administer regulatory re-
gimes.463  Indeed, as Douglas Baird has noted, “[t]he kind of counterclaim that was 
  
with the interests of prepetition unsecured creditors, employees, taxing authorities, regulatory author-
ities, pensioners, and other corporate constituencies, competition forces the courts to squeeze the latter 
groups.  The bankruptcy court competition is not a market but a market failure.”). 
458. See supra note 443; see also Letter From Senator Mitch McConnell to President Barack Obama (May 
2, 2011), available at http://www.blunt.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/b78a4ff6-58c9-48d8-a708-
9e62ee360cc3/5-5-11 Letter to President Obama regarding confirmation of CFPB nominee.pdf 
(“No agency or institution, including Congress, can review the CFPB budget, and no mechanisms 
were put in place to ensure that the director is effectively managing public money.”). 
459. See supra notes 439–442 and accompanying text. 
460. See supra note 440 and accompanying text. 
461. See supra Part II.A.1. 
462. 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
463. See supra notes 213–216 and accompanying text. 
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found suspect in Stern is substantively no different from tort claims that are routinely 
folded into administrative proceedings in which the adjudicators do not have life-
time tenure.”464  Hence, a move toward a traditional administrative model in 
bankruptcy—pursuant to which an agency, rather than the courts, would adjudicate 
in the first instance matters arising in or related to bankruptcy—might go a long 
way in helping to alleviate some of the Article III issues highlighted by Stern.465 
By suggesting that an agency model might help to alleviate some of these 
Article III issues, we mean just that.  We do not mean to imply that the Article III 
concerns would completely disappear.  Issues would still likely be raised about 
whether all of the new agency’s orders could be enforceable without resort to the 
federal courts or whether some of the new bankruptcy agency’s orders, such as those 
involving only so-called related-to claims, would be enforceable only by order of an 
Article III court.466  In sorting this out, it would be necessary to develop a better 
understanding of what aspects of bankruptcy adjudication could fit squarely within 
the “public rights” model, which allows adjudication by a non–Article III agency of 
public rights, as well as those “seemingly ‘private’ right[s] that [are] so closely 
integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency 
resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary.”467 
Scholars have given this issue some attention in the past, although not nearly 
enough.  Alec P. Ostrow, for example, has argued that the discharge in bankruptcy 
easily fits within the public rights model.468  Analogizing to other distributive 
schemes in which the government doles out benefits, he argues that the discharge 
can be seen from the debtor’s perspective as a government benefit that entitles the 
debtor to the release from the burden of preexisting debt.469  Ostrow also sees por-
tions of the distribution of a debtor’s assets to creditors as falling within the public 
rights scheme given that, whether an unsecured claim is entitled to be paid ahead 
of others out of a common pool, “is a matter determined by the federal regulatory 
scheme, rather than state law.”470  Nonetheless, broad consensus has not yet been 
  
464. Baird, supra note 198, at 15. 
465. Cf. id. (noting that the Article III issues involved in Stern likely would have taken a different course if 
Congress had created an agency charged with administering the bankruptcy laws instead of creating 
a court-centered model). 
466. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2610–11 (2011) (discussing whether a bankruptcy court’s order 
is enforceable without resort to an Article III court under the current scheme). 
467. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 594 (1985). 
468. Alec P. Ostrow, Constitutionality of Core Jurisdiction, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 91 (1994). 
469. Id. at 101–02. 
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reached on these issues,471 and if the move to a traditional agency model were to be 
made, we would need to know how bankruptcy could fit within the public rights 
model and what kind of Article III review would be required of the agency’s orders 
so as to avoid the Article III issues that have plagued bankruptcy courts. 
CONCLUSION 
Our current court-centered system of bankruptcy administration is truly ex-
ceptional in many ways.  Two federal administrative agencies, which split their au-
thority along geographic lines, operate within the bankruptcy sphere but lack the 
authority to set policy at the heart of the Bankruptcy Code.  Moreover, Congress has 
delegated to the courts, rather than either administrative agency, the power to fill 
gaps in the Code and thus to set bankruptcy policy.  Additionally, the polyphonic 
nature of the current court-centered model often fails to yield uniform answers, 
causing confusion for litigants and courts alike. 
Our goal in this Article has been to question whether bankruptcy admin-
istration should continue to be exceptional.  We have made the case—grounded in 
both constitutional and policy-driven rationales—for moving bankruptcy admin-
istration toward a more traditional agency model.  We recognize that such a move 
would be paradigm shifting for the bankruptcy field and might well face significant 
political hurdles, but we believe such a move is nonetheless advisable to bring greater 
expertise, accountability, uniformity, accessibility, transparency, prospective clarity, 
and flexibility to policymaking in the bankruptcy arena. 
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50 (1982) (Nos. 81-150 & 81-546), 1982 WL 607231, at *34 (“Just as non–Article III adminis-
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